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Access to credit is crucial for business growth, and 
particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).  Two mechanisms are widely utilized in 
economies around the world to channel credit to the 
SME sector:  (i) market-based financing facilitated 
through secured transactions frameworks, and (ii) 
government-supported financing through public 
guarantee schemes.  Secured transactions frameworks 
reduce credit risk by providing the lender with the 
right to apply the proceeds of the collateral in priority 
over other creditors.  Public guarantee schemes 
undertake to pay a percentage of the owed amount to 
the lender upon default of the borrower.  The different 
nature of these protections offers lenders distinct 
incentives to engage in each type of credit transaction. 
Guarantee schemes are a viable countercyclical mechanism to 
address the economic fallout from extraordinary events, including 
COVID-19.  However, their effectiveness during ordinary times has 
been questioned.  While quantitatively such schemes enable a large 
swath of enterprises to access credit at low rates, qualitatively they 
channel funds to unproductive borrowers, prolong the existence of 
SMEs that should be liquidated, and disadvantage ineligible 
enterprises.  In proportion to gross domestic product, Japanese SMEs 
are the largest users of guarantee schemes in the world.  OECD and 
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IMF studies found that public guarantees result in weak profitability, 
low productivity, and high leverage.  At the same time, they dis-
incentivize financial institutions from investing in credit screening, 
valuation, and monitoring techniques necessary to deploy market-
based financing products.  
This article identifies the negative effects of the Japanese 
guarantee scheme and advocates for modifications to aid the 
development of market-based financing.  It suggests elimination of 
the incentives for both the financial institutions and borrowers to 
continuously utilize this form of government-supported financing 
that sustains zombie companies.  Several recommendations are made 
to induce participating financial institutions to develop expertise in 
the valuation, monitoring, and disposal of collateral, so as to pave the 
way for a transition of viable borrowers to market-based financing.  
However, this transition requires a modern secured transactions legal 
regime that Japan presently lacks.  This article contributes to the 
research and policy debates undertaken within several on-going 
projects that seek to modernize the Japanese legal framework to 
facilitate secured transactions.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
It has been said that the contribution of financial markets to 
economic growth is “almost too obvious for serious discussion.”1  
Financial markets are composed of multiple elements that channel 
credit to the economy.  This article focuses on the types of financial 
market instruments through which small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) access credit.  The obviousness of the statement 
about the contribution of financial markets to economic growth is put 
to a test in examining the credit market for SMEs in Japan.  
Because of their broad role in the economy, SME 
development is key to productivity and inclusive growth.2  As the 
engine for SME development and economic growth overall, access to 
credit is crucial.3  Establishing an environment that enables access to 
credit entails developing a modern credit infrastructure, introducing 
innovative credit products, removing barriers to financial services, 
and formalizing SMEs for inclusion in the formal sector. 4   This 
 
1 Merton H. Miller, Financial Markets and Economic Growth, 11 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 14 (1998).  See also Ben R. Craig et al., Credit Market 
Failure Intervention: Do Government Sponsored Small Business Credit Programs 
Enrich Poorer Areas?, 30 SMALL BUS. ECON. 345 (2008) (“economic growth and 
financial market development tend to be positively correlated”).  But see Robert 
E. Lucas Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 3, 6 (1988) (expressing a contrasting viewpoint that the importance of 
financial markets is “very badly over-stressed”). 
2 See Angel Gurría, 2018 OECD SME Ministerial Conference, ORG. FOR 
ECON. COOP. & DEV (OECD) (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.oecd.org/social/oecd-
sme-ministerial-conference-mexico-2018.htm [https://perma.cc/9C2Y-87Q8] ] 
(“SEMs are key to strengthening productivity”); INT’L. FIN. CORP., MSME 
FINANCE GAP: ASSESSMENT OF THE SHORTFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN 
FINANCING MICRO, SMALL, AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS, at 
1 (2017) (“[Micro, small, and medium enterprises] in emerging markets are widely 
believed to be the engine of growth.”). 
3  See INT’L. FIN. CORP. (IFC), SECURED TRANSACTIONS, COLLATERAL 
REGISTRIES AND MOVABLE ASSET-BASED FINANCING KNOWLEDGE GUIDE, at 4 
(Nov. 2019) (stating that greater access to credit would generate positive impact on 
producitivity and economic growth). 
4 See Id. 
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infrastructure is composed of private law, regulatory rules, and 
various practical aspects that need to be adequately coordinated.5  
Business growth and entrepreneurship are important for 
economic development. 6   Several factors affect the prospect of 
business growth, fostering innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Restricted access to credit is consistently found to be a major 
impediment for SMEs.7  SMEs face higher transactional costs due to 
their opaqueness and lack of adequate collateral.8  In Japan, more 
than 99% of all businesses are SMEs, providing more than 70% of 
private sector jobs.9  Availability of credit, its duration or cost is not 
 
5 See Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Credit Creation: 
Reconciling Legal and Regulatory Incentives, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 
(2018) [hereinafter Castellano & Duvobec, Credit Creation] (discussing the 
necessity of coordinating between legal and regulatory standards to promote 
access to credit); Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Global Regulatory 
Standards and Secured Transactions Law Reforms: At the Crossroad Between 
Access to Credit and Financial Stability, 41 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 531, 532 (2018) 
[hereinafter Castellano & Dubovec, Global Regulatory Standards] (“Oscillating 
between the need of expanding credit creation to promote economic growth and 
the urgency of controlling the excessive accumulation of debt, modern economies 
depend on private law rules and regulatory provisions that originate in different 
fora of the international lawmaking arena.”); Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek 
Dubovec, Bridging the Gap: The Regulatory Dimension of Secured Transactions 
Law Reforms, 22 UNIF. L. REV. 663 (2017) [hereinafter Castellano & Dubovec, 
Bridging the Gap] (“The lack of coordination between secured transactions law 
and capital requirements generates tensions in the legal framework governing 
extension of credit secued by movable assets.”). 
6 Thorsten Beck, Bank Financing for SMEs—Lessons From the Literature, 
225 NAT’L. INST. ECON. REV. 23, 34 (2013). 
7 Id. at 25. 
8 Pietro Calice, Assessing Implementation of the Principles for Public 
Credit Guarantees for SMEs: A Global Survey 5 (World Bank Grp. (WBG), Pol’y 




9 Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2019: An OECD Scoreboard, OECD 
PUBLISHING, at 143 (Apr. 12, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1787/fin_sme_ent-2019-en 
[https://perma.cc/7FDN-Z8DN] (citing 2014 statistics).  See also Mariana 
Colacelli & Gee Hee Hong, Productivity Drag from Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in Japan, INT’L MONETARY FUND (IMF), at 3 (2019) (citing that 
SMEs more than 70% of Japan’s total work force) . 
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however a problem in Japan.10  Its nature and the channel through 
which it is extended are problematic, dampening growth and 
preserving zombie companies.11  
A market failure, such as the lack of information on borrowers 
may result in inefficient allocation of credit.12  Such a failure may 
then become an economic justification for a government-sponsored 
lending or guarantee program.13   Various state interventions have 
been implemented across jurisdictions to prop up SME financing.  
These include co-financing or risk-mitigation facilities, such as 
guarantee schemes, direct lending programs, facilities for the 
pledging of SME loans as collateral against refinancing from the 
central bank, tax and interest rate subsidies. 14   Some of these 
interventions originated as countercyclical measures, but gradually 
became entrenched. 15   The case for deploying a particular 
intervention, including a guarantee scheme to address the failure of 
inadequate access to credit instead of some other intervention has not 
been made.16  
Market-based and government-supported financing are the 
two main credit access channels for SMEs.  The former is facilitated 
by secured transactions frameworks and the latter through public 
guarantee schemes.  Both mechanisms reduce the credit risk of 
 
10 See FIN. STABILITY BD., EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORMS ON SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISE (SME) 
FINANCING 12–13 (2019) [hereinafter FSB, EVALUATION] (showing that three 
quarters of all Japanese SME loans have maturity over one year and an interest 
rate of around 1%). 
11 In a 2019 report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that 
“the overly generous public guarantee schemes in Japan reduce the incentives for 
non-viable businesses to exit, contributing to the survival of inefficient, small and 
old enterprises.”  Colacelli & Hong, supra note 9, at 8.  
12 Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with 
Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 409 (1981). 
13 See Craig et al., supra note 1, at 345, 348 (“The economic justification for 
any government-sponsored small business lending program or loan guarantee 
program must rest on a generally acknowledged failure of the private sector to 
allocate loans efficiently.”). 
14 FSB, EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 2.  For a discussion of preferential 
interest rates, see António Antunes et al., The Effects of Credit Subsidies on 
Development, 58 ECON. THEORY 1 (2015). 
15 FSB, EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 2. 
16 AUGUSTO DE LA TORRE ET AL., INNOVATIVE EXPERIENCES IN ACCESS TO 
FINANCE: MARKET-FRIENDLY ROLES FOR THE VISIBLE HAND? 196 (2017). 
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lenders, including non-recovery and insolvency, but in different 
ways.17  Market-based financing products provide the lender with 
access to an asset (collateral) that may be disposed of upon default of 
the borrower with priority over other creditors of the same borrower.  
Government-supported financing reduces the risk of the lender by 
payment of a percentage of the owed amount upon default of the 
borrower, whether or not collateral has been taken by the lender.  The 
different nature of the credit risk mitigant also affects the behavior of 
lenders and borrowers differently.  
Inefficient legal frameworks for secured transactions may be 
a justification for the heavy reliance on public credit guarantees.18  If 
guarantee schemes are established or supported with the objective of 
addressing market failure, they should be structured to lead to the 
establishment of market-based financing.  Such a structure 
presupposes building lender capacity, generating relevant data on the 
collateral, and aiding regulatory compliance.19 
The use of collateral increases borrowers’ incentives to 
conduct commercial activities in a manner that maximizes revenues.  
This is because the provision of collateral shifts the risk of losses to 
the borrower, enhancing motivation to repay the loan.  In contrast, a 
guaranteed loan that is not secured with any assets provides less 
motivation to repay the loan.  This is especially the case where the 
culture, reinforced by the guarantee scheme design, dis-incentivizes 
termination of the lending relationship.  In Japan, borrowers are rarely 
forced into insolvency or their assets liquidated.20  Instead, financial 
institutions restructure the loan, with support from the guarantee 
scheme, preserving the existence of a zombie company.  This 
negatively affects the company, its healthy competitors, causing 
 
17 See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting out of 
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1217 (2005) 
(arguing that security interests enable shifting of the insolvency risk onto other 
creditors). 
18 DE LA TORRE ET AL., supra note 16. 
19 See Castellano & Dubovec, Bridging the Gap, supra note 5; U.S. AGENCY 
FOR INT’L. DEV., FROM LAWS TO LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN 
ACHIEVING THE PROMISE OF SECURED LENDING REFORMS 37 (2018) [hereinafter 
USAID, FROM LAWS TO LOANS] (“[G]uarantees should be scoped to work in 
unison with other programs and policies to encourage lending practices that help 
move both lenders and individual borrowers off guarantees over time, enabling 
the redirection of remaining resources to new customers and needs.”). 
20 See infra Section III(0). 
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distortions in the overall market.21  A study of Japanese firms that 
used guaranteed loans concluded that: 
Generous guarantees likely helped firms that had 
fundamental difficulties but did not conduct serious 
restructurings, so-called “Zombie” firms, to remain 
alive.  The existence of Zombies decreases the 
efficiency of the economy. . . . The Japanese 
government must hurry to rebuild a credit guarantee 
system that makes clear whom it should support, and 
encourages firms and banks to make an effort to 
increase efficiency and competitiveness.22  
The impact of guarantee schemes on secured lending has been 
studied globally,23  including in Japan.24   In some economies, the 
schemes have been popular finance mechanisms and considered the 
most effective government support program for SME lending. 25  
However, an assessment of sixty credit guarantee schemes in fifty-
four countries, twenty-two of which were high-income economies, 
including Japan, confirmed that improperly designed schemes could 
be costly and provide limited value.26  
Guarantee schemes are, by far, the most prevalent mechanism 
supporting the credit needs of Japanese businesses.  In proportion to 
its gross domestic product (GDP), Japan is the largest user of public 
 
21 See Ricardo J. Caballero et al., Zombie Lending and Depressed 
Restructuring in Japan, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1943, 1944 (2008) (indicating that 
the phenomenon of zombie firms and zombie banks emerged in the 1990s). 
22 Nobuyoshi Yamori, Japanese SMEs and the Credit Guarantee System 
After the Global Financial Crisis, 3 COGENT ECON. & FIN. 1, 17 (2015). 
23 For the impact on the use of collateral in secured transactions, see INT’L. 
FIN. CORP., supra note 3, at 41–42.  
24 Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Insolvency Law as Credit Enhancement and 
Enforcement Mechanism: A Closer Look At Global Modernization of Secured 
Transactions Laws, 27 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 673, text accompanying 
note 54 (2018). 
25 See Thorsten Beck et al., Bank Financing for SMEs around the World 7–8 
(WBG, Pol’y Rsch. Working Paper No. 4785, 2008), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/706131468159334938/pdf/WPS4785.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2UPT-MGZA] (discussing banks’ perception of government 
programs that support SMEs in both developed and developing countries). 
26 See Calice, supra note 8 (assessing implementation of the Principles for 
public credit guarantees for SMEs). 
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guarantees in the world.27  Acknowledging the negative effect of this 
type of lending, Japan has undertaken efforts to modernize its secured 
transactions framework to provide a legal environment more 
conducive to market-based financing.28  The design of a guarantee 
scheme will inevitably affect the deployment of any reformed secured 
transactions framework in Japan, particularly to support asset-based 
lending that relies on inventory and receivables as collateral.29  
Public guarantees have proven to be an effective 
countercyclical tool to address some negative consequences of 
extraordinary events, such as natural disasters or credit crises.30  Their 
role has also increased during the COVID-19 pandemic.  However, 
during these extraordinary situations and states of emergency, the 
functions and features of public guarantees differ and do not apply 
generally when assessing their role in facilitating access to credit in 
economies.  
 
27 See infra Section IV(0).  
28 In relation to assignment of receivables, a new obligational law, enacted 
May 26, 2017, entered into force April 1, 2020.  An informal project to reform the 
secured transaction law relating to movable assets (including receivables) is being 
spearheaded by the Ministry of Justice, called “Dousan Saiken wo Chushin 
toshita Tanpohousei ni Kansuru Kenkyukai” [Research Group on Security 
Interest Primarily in Movable Assets and Receivables], 
https://www.shojihomu.or.jp/kenkyuu/dou-tanpohousei [https://perma.cc/RQ74-
M8FZ] (last accessed Oct. 24, 2020).  The Japan Business Credit Project (JBCP), 
an ongoing research project of Professor Megumi Hara, Gakushuin University 
School of Law, Professor Kumiko Koens, Yamagata University Faculty of 
Literature and Social Sciences, and Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., University 
of Pennsylvania Law School, involves an assessment of business credit and legal 
framework in Japan, including financing secured by personal property.  It 
examines the reasons why such secured financing represents only a small portion 
of Japanese business credit and why Japan has not adopted modern principles of 
secured transactions law.  Preliminary findings particularly relevant to this article 
are that the prevalence of government guarantees of bank loans to SMEs 
discourage the extension of such secured credit and impede the adoption of 
secured transactions law reforms.  See also Mooney, supra note 24.   
29 See infra Section III(0). 
30 See Arito Ono & Yukihiro Yasuda, Forgiveness Versus Financing: The 
Determinants and Impact of SME Debt Forbearance in Japan, 17 RSCH. INST. 
ECON., TRADE & INDUS. DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 1, 5 (2017), 
https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/17e086.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY9Y-
U2ZD] (stating that before the global financial crisis, 40% of Japanese SMEs had 
their loans guaranteed). 
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This article explores the key roles of guarantee schemes and 
their effect on market-based financing.  It finds ample evidence that 
the system of guaranteed lending has negative economic 
additionality. 31   Guaranteed lending does not facilitate “value-
creation-orientated” financing, highlighted in a 2012 report by the 
Financial System Council of Japan.32  It stifles the growth of Japanese 
SMEs and the exit of zombie companies.  Its magnitude and 
entrenchment is a significant hurdle to the development of market-
based financing.  This article is organized as follows.  After this 
Introduction, Section II examines various types of state interventions 
and their effect on access to credit.  Section III describes the current 
lending conditions in Japan, including the type of credit available to 
SMEs and the secured transactions legal framework.  Section IV 
traces the evolution of guarantee schemes, maps the various types, 
provides a detailed description of the Japanese Credit 
Supplementation System, and highlights the functions of guarantee 
schemes during crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic.  Section 
V identifies various incentives for Japanese lenders and borrowers to 
utilize government-supported financing, and identifies distortions 
caused by the guarantee scheme.  Section VI concludes.   
II. STATE INTERVENTIONS IN CREDIT MARKETS: ARE 
THEY INCENTIVIZING ACCESS TO CREDIT? 
Various state interventions seek to facilitate access to credit 
and contribute to the operation of a safe and sound financial system.  
These interventions may be general providing an enabling legal and 
regulatory environment, but also be specific affecting the allocation 
 
31 See Facundo Abraham & Sergio L. Schmukler,  Are Public Credit 
Guarantees Worth the Hype? (WGB, Rsch. & Pol’y Brief No. 11, 2017), 
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/431261511201811430/pdf/Are-
public-credit-guarantees-worth-the-hype.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF99-3SCK] 
(stating that economic additionality means improvement in the performance of 
borrowers); Calice, supra note 8. (arguing that measuring financial and economic 
additionality of credit guarantee schemes remains challenging). 
32 FIN. SYS. COUNCIL, THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY: DESIRABLE 
STATE IN THE MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM (PRESENT STATE AND FUTURE 
OUTLOOK) 14–15 (2012), 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/singie_kinyu/20120831/01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PP8T-82WM]. 
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of credit risk or the cost structure of a transaction.33  The specific 
measures include reducing capital requirements for selected types of 
loans, imposing lending requirements on financial institutions to 
dedicate a proportion of their loan book to a specific industry, 
providing credit guarantees to cover post-default losses, establishing 
and supporting state banks, or providing various refinancing facilities 
where financial institutions may obtain funds against self-liquidating 
instruments, such as loans secured with warehouse receipts.34  These 
interventions are generally designed to address a credit market failure 
that impairs access to credit.35  
The existence of a market failure does not, on its own, provide 
the basis to institutionalize a particular state intervention from the 
menu of available options.36  In many cases, especially for public 
guarantees, they may distort the discipline of the competitive 
 
33 See Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation, supra note 5, at 65–66. 
34 See DE LA TORRE ET AL., supra note 16, at 77 (listing state intervetion 
measures).  See generally LEORA KLAPPER & RIDA ZAIDI, A SURVEY OF 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND INTERVENTION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 102 
(2005) (discussing other types of state interventions); infra Section IV(0) 
(discussing other measures deployed during a crisis); Tatiana Didier et al., 
Financing Firms in Hibernation During the COVID-19 Pandemic 19 (WBG, 




(showing that authorizing the central bank to purchase portoflios of SME loans is 
an example of a measure deployed during a crisis).   
35 Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, Digital Technology-Based 
Solutions for Enhanced Effectiveness of Secured Transactions Law: The Road To 
Perfection?, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 25–26 (2018). 
36 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Role of the State in Financial Markets, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMIES 1993 19–20 (1994). 
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market,37 and even disadvantage the most innovative businesses.38  
Guarantee schemes firmly entrenched within a system may become a 
disincentive to institutionalizing an enabling legal and regulatory 
environment. 
Various justifications have been provided for 
institutionalizing state interventions to address a particular market 
failure.  The rationale for implementing directed lending programs 
may be to channel financing to increase industry production, 
especially where tariffs and subsidies are ineffective, 39  or where 
specific projects would not otherwise be funded.40  A directed lending 
policy typically requires financial institutions to dedicate a certain 
percentage of their loan portfolio to a designated sector of the 
economy, such as exports, manufacturing, or agriculture, but without 
necessarily having to take any collateral.41  Other state interventions 
have been implemented to facilitate the development of a certain 
market followed by their gradual retraction when the market operates 
efficiently.  Bankers’ acceptances are one such measure utilized in 
the United States to provide short-term trade finance under the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913. 42   Acceptances issued to finance 
 
37 Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, On the Management of Financial 
Guarantees, 21 Fin. Mgmt. 87, 103 (1992).  For Japan, see Chusho-kigyo 
Shoukibo-Jigyousha no Jigyou no Hatten wo Sasaeru Jizoku Kanouna 
Sinyouhokan Seiso no Kakuritu ni Mukete [Small & Medium Enter. Pol’y Making 
Council Fin. Working Grp., Working Paper on Establishment of Credit 
Supplement System Fostering the Growth of SMEs, 2016], 
https://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/koukai/shingikai/kihonmondai/2016/161221kihon
mondai2.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8QB-US6W] [hereinafter SME Credit 
Supplement System]. 
38 Aaron Edlin, Overtaking, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE 
RULE OF LAW 475 (F.H. Buckley ed. 2013). 
39 See Dimitri Vittas & Yoon Je Cho, Credit Policies: Lessons from Japan 
and Korea, 11 WORLD BANK RSCH. OBSERVER 277, 279 (1996) (“If firms lack 
access to credit, other industrial policy tools, such as tariffs and subsidies, that 
may rely on cost and profit incentives to increase production could prove 
ineffective.”). 
40 Stiglitz, supra note 36, at 19, 30. 
41 See KLAPPER & ZAIDI, supra note 34 (stating that these programs have 
generated many inefficiencies, including the misuse of allocated credit, increase 
in the cost of finance for borrowers ineligible to benefit from the policy, and low 
repayment rates). 
42 Ralph T Helfrich, Trading in Bankers’ Acceptances: A View from the 
Acceptance Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, FED. RSRV. BANK OF 
N.Y. MONTHLY REV., Feb. 1976, at 51. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
2021] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 385 
 
imports and exports, shipment and storage of goods were eligible for 
discount43 by a Reserve Bank if they met certain criteria.44  They have 
been gradually replaced by market-based financing products.  
Credit market failures may become particularly acute in the 
aftermath of extraordinary events necessitating the deployment of 
state interventions to balance the countercyclical effects.  The 
effectiveness of these interventions depends to a great extent on the 
magnitude of the crisis, its origins, and the overall level of non-
performing loans. 45   However, the connection between the two 
applications is close, as an intervention established to bolster SME 
access to credit during a crisis may persist.  Their perpetuation 
becomes problematic in that guarantee schemes designed to tackle 
countercyclical effects when such circumstances no longer exist 
transfer excessive credit risk to the public sector.46  The exponential 
use of guarantee schemes to tackle the economic effects of the 
COVID-19 pandemic presents a significant risk for market-based 
financing if the schemes are not rolled back efficiently supporting 
economic recovery.  
Several state interventions have been deployed in Japan’s 
recent history to stimulate access to credit.  Many of them have 
already been discontinued due to their negligible or questionable 
economic impact.  For instance, banker acceptances emerged as a 
financing tool post World War I to stimulate commodities trading.47  
 
43 This means a Reserve Bank may rediscount them for accepting banks at 
the Federal Reserve’s Discount Rate.  
44 Robert K. La Roche, Bankers Acceptances, 79 FED. RSRV. BANK OF 
RICHMOND ECON. Q. 75, 78 (1993). 
45 Douglas W. Arner et al., Financial Stability, Resolution of Systemic 
Banking Crises and COVID-19: Toward an Appropriate Role for Public Support 
and Bailouts 4 (Univ. of H.K. Fac. of L. Rsch. Paper No. 2020/044, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3664523 
[https://perma.cc/2WAJ-72YH].  
46 LUCIA CUSMANO, SME AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP FINANCING, THE ROLE 
OF CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES AND MUTUAL GUARANTEE SOCIETIES IN 
SUPPORTING FINANCE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 54 (OECD 
& SME Entrepreneurship Papers, 2018), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/sme-and-entrepreneurship-financing_35b8fece-en 
[https://perma.cc/7XNS-XUZU]. 
47 Katsufumi Kanaoka, Nihon ni Okeru Ginkouhikiuketegataseido no 
Sousetsu: 1919 (Taisho 8) ~ 1927 (Showa 2) nen ni Okeru 
Ginkouhikiuketegatasijou no Tenkai [Creation of Banker’s Acceptance System in 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss3/1
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The Bank of Japan rediscounted eligible acceptances enhancing their 
use and attractiveness for banks.  However, because the eligibility 
criteria were very strict, they were used less extensively than in the 
United States.  Several attempts to reinvigorate the acceptance market 
in Japan failed. 48   The Japanese government also designed and 
deployed directed lending schemes.49  These were used primarily to 
expand capacity and modernize the industry in the 1950s and 1960s.50  
Notably, the borrowers that received such financial assistance 
increased investment, and within three years weaned themselves off 
directed lending and relied instead on market-based loans. 51   At 
different time periods, directed lending did not improve the 
borrowers’ profitability or investment prospects.52  Over the decades, 
guarantee schemes have grown significantly and remained the 
dominant state intervention supporting access to credit for Japanese 
SMEs. 
III. SME LENDING IN JAPAN: CONDITIONS AND LAW 
This Section examines the lending environment in Japan, 
setting the stage for analyzing the role of guaranteed and secured 
lending.  It acknowledges that the development of market-based 
financing presupposes the existence of an effectively secured 
transactions legal framework.  Such frameworks have been 
constructed around a set of internationally recognized principles.  
While presently the Japanese legal framework fails to meet them, a 
 
Japan: Development of Banker’s Acceptance Market from 1919 to 1927], 
NINGENSHAKAKIKANKYOUKENKYU 39–86 (2007).  
48 Id. 
49 See Iichiro Uesugi et al., The Effectiveness of Public Credit Guarantees in 
the Japanese Loan Market, 24 J. JPN. INT’L ECON. 457, 460 (2010) (discussing the 
credit guarantee system in Japan); Arito Ono et al., Are Lending Relationships 
Beneficial or Harmful for Public Credit Guarantees? Evidence from Japan’s 
Emergency Credit Guarantee Program, 9 J. FIN. STABILITY 151, 152 (2013) 
(discussing public credit guarantees in Japan which include the credit guarantee 
system). 
50 Vittas & Cho, supra note 39, at 277, 282. 
51 Vittas & Cho, supra note 39, at 286. 
52 See Masami Imai, Regulatory Responses to Banking Crisis: Lessons from 
Japan, 39 GLOB. FIN. J. 10, 14 (2019) (discussing the negative impact practices of 
regulatory capital arbitrage had imposed on Japanese economy as well as 
problems of Japanese government’s regulatory policies).   
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
2021] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 387 
 
legal reform effort has already been undertaken to incorporate a 
number of those principles.   
Lending Conditions 
Japanese businesses have ample access to low-cost credit.  In 
2019, credit to the private sector exceeded 174% of the Japanese 
GDP.53  Even though this percentage signifies a high maturity of the 
financial market, a significant proportion of SME credit has been 
supported by guarantee schemes.  Interest rates on loans have been 
hovering around historically low levels, and lending is increasing 
annually at around 2%. 54   The Bank of Japan highlighted that 
profitability of lending continues to decline in this environment that 
increases competitive pressure on lenders to reduce the interest rate 
below the risk commensurate to the loan. 55   This competitive 
environment also has the effect of reducing the use of credit 
guarantees because the applicable fees increase transactional costs.  
However, the credit risk of financial institutions increases as the loans 
are neither guaranteed nor collateralized.  
Japanese businesses face numerous economic challenges, 
including shrinking domestic markets, declining sales, sluggish 
performance, and low competitiveness. 56   These challenges have 
been compounded by guarantee schemes.  The OECD concluded that 
guaranteed lending in Japan results in weak profitability, low 
productivity, and high leverage of SMEs.57  The Japan Productivity 
Center found that Japan ranks 21st among the OECD countries in 
labor productivity.58  The unsuitability of guaranteed lending was 
 
53 See Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)—Japan, THE WORLD 
BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS?locations=JP 
[https://perma.cc/7LGJ-2BDX] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020).   
54 BANK OF JAPAN, FINANCIAL SYSTEM REPORT 1, 88 (Apr. 2019). 
55 Id. at 2. 
56 FIN. SYS. COUNCIL, supra note 32, at 14–15. 
57 OECD, JAPAN: BOOSTING GROWTH AND WELL-BEING IN AN AGEING 
SOCIETY 15 (2016).  See Naoyuki Yoshino & Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary, Major 
Challenges Facing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Asia and Solutions for 
Mitigating Them 7 (ADBI Working Paper Series No. 564, 2016) (stating that only 
5% of Japanese SMEs invest in research and development, which is 
comparatively low). 
58 Roudouseisansei no kokusaihikaku [International Comparison on Labor 
Productivity], JAPAN PRODUCTIVITY CTR., https://www.jpc-
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confirmed in the Financial Sector Assessment Program Report of the 
IMF.59  
In the year of 2020, the number of bankruptcies in Japan 
reached 7,773, which is the lowest in fifty years.60  This is attributable 
primarily to the support of credit guarantees and other measures to 
prop up failing businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic. 61  
Liquidation is the dominant process.62  According to the 2020 World 
Bank’s Doing Business Report for Japan, the recovery rate for 
secured creditors is among the highest in the world, an average of 
92.1 cents on the dollar of the creditor claims, compared to the OECD 
average of 70.2.63  Insolvency thus does not pose a risk to secured 
creditors.  
The asset structure of Japanese businesses is conducive to 
collateralized lending.  According to Japan’s Ministry of Finance, in 
2018, local companies (excluding banks and insurance companies) 
 
net.jp/research/assets/pdf/R2attached2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PQJ-T2DD] (last 
accessed Oct. 24, 2020). 
59 IMF, JAPAN: FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: TECHNICAL 
NOTE—LONG-TERM CHALLENGES FOR FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 55–57 (IMF 
Country Report No. 17/283, Sept. 2017).  See also Keieisha-Hosho ni Kansuru 
Guideline Kenkyu-kai [Working Group on Guideline for Personal Guarantee 
Provided by Business Owners] (2014); Keieisha-Hosho ni Kansuru Guideline 
[Guideline for Personal Guarantee Provided by Business Owners] (2014); 
Keieisha-Hosho ni Kansuru Guideline Kenkyu-kai [Working Group on Guideline 
for Personal Guarantee Provided by Business Owners] (2014). 
60 Zenkoku Tousan Joukyou (2020 nendo Kamihanki), TOKYO SHOKO RSCH. 
(TSR), https://www.tsr-net.co.jp/en/bankruptcy/2020.html 
[https://perma.cc/JXD3-E2WN] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).  
61Cf. Kimie Harada et al., Lessons from Japan’s Shadow Financial 
Regulatory Committee Japan in the Global Financial Crisis, in WORLD IN CRISIS: 
INSIGHTS FROM SIX SHADOW FINANCIAL REGULATORY COMMITTEES FROM 
AROUND THE WORLD 193, 219 (Robert Lipton ed., 2011). 
62 Out of 8,517 insolvency cases in 2015, liquidation accounted for 97%.  
Randall Jones & Yosuke Jin, Boosting Productivity for Inclusive Growth in Japan 
13 (OECD Econ. Dep’t Working Paper No. 1414, 2017). 
63 This impressive recovery rate reflects:  (i) the average duration of 
insolvency proceedings at 0.6 years, compared to the 1.7 years OECD average; 
and (ii) the relatively low cost of insolvency proceedings at around 4.2% of the 
debtor’s estate, compared to the OECD average of 9.3%.  WBG, Doing Business 
2020: Japan 104–105 (2020), 
https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/j/japan/JPN.p
df [https://perma.cc/N5J5-4WA8]. 
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held receivables nearly equal in value to land. 64   Moreover, the 
aggregate value of receivables and inventory was estimated to be 
valued at around 1.5 times that of land.65   Despite the value of 
personal property that Japanese SMEs own, its use as collateral has 
been negligible.66   
Studies found that those Japanese borrowers that have long-
term relationships with banks are more likely to provide collateral.67  
While a typical Japanese SME has a long-term relationship with a 
single bank, it engages in transactions with multiple financial 
institutions.68  These multiple relationships are insurance for when 
one of those financial institutions experiences difficulties that result 
in retraction of lending.  Given the common occurrence of borrowers 
having relationships with multiple financial institutions, the use of 
collateral is partially motivated by the desire of the financial 
institution to establish the priority of its claim over the other financial 
institutions with which the borrower transacts.69  Figure 1 presents 
the total number of loans extended to Japanese borrowers that have 
been secured with some asset.  
 
64 MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUS. (METI), Financial Statements 
Statistics of Corporations by Industry 2018, https://www.e-
stat.go.jp/dbview?sid=0003060791 [https://perma.cc/L2HM-VECX] (last 
accessed Oct. 24, 2020). 
65 See Statistics of Japan, E-STAT,  https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en 
[https://perma.cc/2GLB-BSS4] (last accessed Oct. 24, 2020).  
66 A study of a sample of 400,000 Japanese firms between 2007 and 2010 
found that 51.9% mortgaged real estate, 23% did not provide any collateral, and 
44.6% of firms obtained fully or partially guaranteed loans.  Arito Ono et al., A 
New Look at Bank-Firm Relationships and the Use of Collateral in Japan: 
Evidence from Teikoku Databank Data, in THE ECONOMICS OF INTERFIRM 
NETWORKS 204–205 (Tsutomu Watanabe et al. eds., 2015).  This is at odds with 
FSB data which indicated that over the last decade, collateralization of loans has 
been reduced from over 90% of loans being secured with a right in an asset to less 
than 80%.  FSB, EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 13–14. 
67 Arito Ono & Iichiro Uesugi, Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees 
in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan’s SME Loan Market, 41 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT & BANK. 935, 936 (2009). 
68 Id., at 935, 937.  It has been estimated that 80% of Japanese enterprises 
have relationships with multiple banks. Ono et al., supra note 66. 
69 Ono, supra note 67, at 951. 
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Use of Asset-Based Lending (ABL) in Japan: Figure 170 
 
Banks are the primary driver of SME finance in Japan. When 
lending, banks rely on guarantees, and, to some extent, collateral, 
disregarding the overall business value.71  Fintech credit (estimated 
at 2.2 billion USD in 2019) in Japan is primarily extended in the form 
of P2P/marketplace business and property lending. 72   Although 
 
70 Teikoku Data Bank, Kigyou no Tayouna Sikinchoutatu Shuho ni Kansuru 
Jittai Houkokusho 2019nen 2 gatsu [Report on the current status of various 




71 This practice leads to “Japanese version of lending exclusion.”  In 
contrast, some regional banks and credit unions challenge the traditional lending 
model fostering “lending inclusion” by deploying different lending methods.  The 
FSA policies have contributed to this bipolarization in the lending market.  See 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY (FSA), Summary Points from Strategic Directions 
and Priorities 2016–2017, https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2016/20161130-
1/01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C92-7XTM] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020); Takunori 
Hashimoto, The Bipolarization of the Regional Banks and Its Future “Problem 
Solving Type Banks” and “Lending Exclusion Type Banks,” 14 J. JPN. SOC. 
INTELL. PROD. 14, 15 (2018). 
72 Giulio Cornelli et al, Fintech and Big Tech Credit: A New Database 8 
(BIS, Working Paper No. 887, Sept. 2020). 
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BigTech credit represents only a moderate share of overall credit,73 
Japan is the second-largest market for BigTech credit (23.5 billion 
USD in 2019).74  Rakuten has offered a suite of financial products in 
Japan since 2013, including payments, lending, credit cards, 
mortgages and insurance. 75   Social media company LINE offers 
consumer lending (through a joint venture with Mizuho Bank and a 
credit card company), telecommunication firm NTT DoCoMo 
provides customer credit-scoring services (under contractual 
agreement with banks and customers), and Amazon lends through its 
seller lending program.76   The second largest telecommunications 
provider, KDDI, has a joint venture with MUFG Bank called Au 
Jibun Bank.77  
The use of collateralized lending presupposes the existence of 
a legal framework that is conducive to that type of lending.78  Such a 
legal framework enables an efficient use of personal property, such 
as inventory and receivables as collateral for a loan.  
Secured Transactions Frameworks: International Principles and 
Japan  
A modern secured transactions framework achieves several 
objectives if it sits on top of a solid foundation.79  First, it facilitates 
access to secured credit for businesses.80  Second, it fosters financial 
 
73 Jon Frost et al, BigTech and the Changing Structure of Financial 
Intermediation 11 (BIS, Working Paper No. 799, Apr. 2019).  




78 In jurisdictions with outdated legal regimes, SMEs frequently cite 
insufficient or unacceptable collateral as the reason for not being able to access 
credit.  See DE LA TORRE ET AL., supra note 16, at 5. 
79 See EUR. BANK RECONSTRUCTION & DEV. (EBRD), Secured 
Transactions, https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/legal-reform/access-to-
finance/transactions.html [https://perma.cc/2XQQ-8EFY] (last accessed Nov. 1, 
2020) (stating the Ten Core Principles published by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to supplement its 1994 Model Law on 
Secured Transactions and the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) in its 2016 Model Law on Secured Transactions).  
80 In some economies with inefficient secured transactions frameworks, 
credit to the private sector may be around 30% of their gross domestic product 
(GDP).  See IFC, supra note 3, at 5.  
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inclusion by expanding finance in underserved segments of the 
economy.81   Finally, when coordinated with prudential regulatory 
standards, it reinforces financial stability and responsible lending.82  
Such a solid foundation should be constructed from a set of principles.  
These principlescover all aspects of secured transactions, 
addressing risks, inefficiencies and frictions.  They include:  (i) 
comprehensive coverage of all forms of security interests in personal 
property (the functional approach); (ii) enabling the borrower to, 
efficiently and at a low cost, create a security interest without 
depriving it of the use of those assets; (iii) security interests available 
over all types of personal property, to secure all types of obligations, 
between all types of persons; (iv) effective means of publicizing the 
existence of security interests to third parties; (v) an electronic and 
notice-based registry that enables searches according to identifiers of 
persons who granted security interests; (vi) priority rules that enable 
access to credit from multiple creditors, including suppliers and 
lessors; (vii) predictable rules governing the competing rights of 
persons in the collateral, including non-consensual creditors; (viii) on 
default, the ability to promptly and efficiently enforce a security 
interest against the collateral to satisfy the secured obligation; (ix) 
predictable conflicts of laws rules that determine the law applicable 
to various aspects of the secured transaction; and (x) the protection of 
a security interest in insolvency.83  
The Japanese secured transactions framework deviates from 
most of these principles.  Foremost, it does not follow the functional 
approach that recognizes multiple security devices that may be used 
side by side without a coherent priority regime underpinned by an 
 
81 See generally INT’L FIN. CORP. (IFC), Financial Inclusion: Creating 
Opportunity through Financial, https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1116ecf6-
9fdb-415f-ae2f-
304a8b9dc8d8/Financial+Inclusion.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=kkIBXtL 
[https://perma.cc/JE46-8GNH] (last accessed Oct. 30, 2020).  
82 See Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation, supra note 5; Castellano & 
Dubovec, Global Regulatory Standards, supra note 5. 
83 See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Lost in Transplantation? Modern 
Principles of Secured Transactions Law as Legal Transplants, in SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS LAW IN ASIA: PRINCIPLES, PERSPECTIVES AND REFORM (Louise 
Gullifer & Dora Neo eds., 2020); MAREK DUBOVEC & LOUISE GULLIFER, 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM IN AFRICA 36–40 (2019). 
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electronic registration system. 84   The Civil Code recognizes the 
following four types of security interests (real rights) (i) pledge; (ii) 
hypothec; (iii) preferential rights (e.g., a right to the payment of 
wages); and (iv) rights of retention.  Japanese SMEs also utilize trade 
credit, where the seller may retain ownership until payment of the 
purchase price in full while the buyer/debtor acquires possession and 
use of the asset.85  New types of security interests emerged through 
case law or were provided for in special statutes, such as for the 
financing of cars, agricultural products, construction machines, 
aircraft, ships, or the entirety of assets of particular types of 
businesses, such as railroad companies.86  As a consequence of these 
developments, the legal framework is fragmented.  
Some security interests, such as the sale and leaseback or 
security transfer of ownership [joto-tanpo] emerged in response to 
the impracticality of the Civil Code.  The impracticalities exist with 
respect to the failure to recognize a security interest over an asset in 
possession of a borrower that needs to use or sell it, the inefficiency 
of the enforcement provisions, as well as the need to more easily 
achieve priority over competing claims.87  The increasing growth in 
utilization of joto-tanpo in practice has been supported by a number 
of Supreme Court decisions.88  However, this device has practical 
limitations, including the inability to cover all assets that typically 
secure an asset-based loan, especially inventory, receivables, and 
proceeds, as well as the uncertainty stemming from the effect of 
registration.89  Unlike the United States, Japan has not established an 
 
84 For the explanation of the functional approach, see Hideki Kanda, 
Methodology for Harmonization and Modernization of Legal Rules on Secured 
Transactions: Legal, Functional, or Otherwise?, 22 UNIF. L. REV. 885, 885–886 
(2017). 
85 Daisuke Tsuruta, How Do Small Businesses Finance Their Growth 
Opportunities?—The Case of Recovery from the Lost Decade in Japan, 33 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 189, 191 (2012).  
86 HIROTO DOGAUCHI & TANPO BUKKEN HOU, SECURITY INTEREST LAW 
(4th ed., 2017); Megumi Hara, Japan, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW IN ASIA: 
PRINCIPLES, PERSPECTIVES, AND REFORM (Louise Gullifer and Dora Neo eds., 
2020).   
87 Id. at 6–7.  See also HISAKAZU MATSUOKA & TANPO BUKKEN HOU, 
SECURITY INTEREST LAW 208–311 (Nihonhyoronsha, 2017); HIROSHI ODA, 
JAPANESE LAW 166, 177 (3d ed., 2009). 
88 See, e.g., Hanrei Jihou Sept. 28, 1982 [1981(O) No. 1209] No. 1062, 81. 
89 Hara, supra note 86. 
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equivalent to the UCC Article 9 filing system.  In such a legal 
environment, it is challenging for Japanese lenders, when they extend 
market-based or guaranteed loans, to reliably take a security interest 
in some collateral.   
Recent reforms to facilitate the financing of receivables by 
limiting the effect of anti-assignment clauses are a step forward.  
However, they fall short of aligning the Japanese framework with the 
international principles.90  Given the many departures of the Japanese 
secured transactions framework from the modern principles, steering 
lenders toward asset-based lending may present legal risks that would 
make the cost of such credit uneconomical and unattractive as 
compared to guaranteed loans.  The abundance of low-cost 
guaranteed credit affects the incentives to consider reform of the 




91 The design of a secured transactions reform in Japan and the effect of 
public guarantees is being explored by the Japan Business Credit Project.  The 
Secured Transactions Law Reform in Japan: Globally and in Japan Conference, 
co-organized by The Bank of Japan, Gakushuin University, Nishimura & Asahi, 
and University of Pennsylvania Law School, held July 30-31, 2018 in Tokyo, 
recognized and discussed the connection between public guarantee schemes and 
secured lending in Japan. Those discussions also influenced the focus of this 
article.  The Japan Business Credit Project (JBCP) is a research project of 
Professor Megumi Hara, Gakushuin University School of Law, Professor Kumiko 
Koens, Yamagata University Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, and 
Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., University of Pennsylvania Law School.  The 
JBCP has undertaken more than 30 semi-structured interviews of bankers, legal 
practitioners, academics, and government officials.  The project involves an 
assessment of business credit in Japan, including financing secured by movables 
and receivables and the relevant legal framework.  It includes an examination of 
the reasons why such secured financing represents only a small portion of 
Japanese business credit and why Japan has not adopted modern principles of 
secured transactions law.  Preliminary findings particularly relevant to this paper 
are that the prevalence of government guarantees of bank loans to SMEs 
discourage the extension of such secured credit and impede the adoption of 
secured transactions law reforms.  See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Insolvency Law as 
Credit Enhancement and Enforcement Mechanism: A Closer Look at Global 
Modernization of Secured Transactions Laws, 27 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
673 (2018); Mooney, supra note 83; 83Hara, supra note 86.   
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
2021] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 395 
 
IV. CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES: EVOLUTION, 
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES, TYPES, AND THE JAPANESE 
STRUCTURE 
Evolution 
From their emergence in nineteenth century Europe, 
guarantee schemes proliferated in the last decades.92  Particularly in 
some OECD countries, they have become the policy of choice for 
supporting SME credit.93  The reasons for their establishment vary 
and also depend on the state of the financial market.  In economies 
with developing financial markets that do not efficiently distribute 
risks, guarantee schemes have played a transitory role providing a 
bridge to market-based financing.94  
Guarantee schemes in Japan have a long history, operating at 
the level of prefectures with support from a central governmental 
agency.  In 1948, the Japanese government established the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Agency, which led the process of forming 
prefectural credit guarantee corporations (CGCs). 95   The Credit 
Guarantee Law No. 196 of 1953 governs the establishment, 
administration, and operations of CGCs that are subject to the 
supervision of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 
the Financial Services Agency (FSA), as well as local authorities in 
the prefectures where they operate.  
 
 
92 OCED, FACILITATING ACCESS TO FINANCE: DISCUSSION PAPER ON 
CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES 3 (2010), 
https://www.oecd.org/globalrelations/45324327.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8R2-
2E3B]. 
93 See also Uesugi, supra note 49, at 458; Moustafa Chatzouz et al., Credit 
Guarantee Schemes for SME Lending in Western Europe 10 (Eur. Inv. Fund 
(EIB), Working Paper No. 2017/42, June 2017), 
http://www.eif.org/news_centre/publications/eif_wp_42.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CR46-3CST]. 
94 Deniz Anginer et al., Risk-Bearing by the State: When Is It Good Public 
Policy?, J. FIN. STABILITY 76 (2013), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/13732?show=full 
[https://perma.cc/8583-NMGN].  The inefficient distribution of risks is largely 
attributable to the lenders’ lack the expertise in extending and administering loans 
secured with personal property.  
95 Uesugi, supra note 49, at 460–61.  
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Since 1951, the government has insured guarantees issued by 
the prefectural CGCs.96  Today, the insurance is provided by the 
Japan Finance Corporation (JFC).  The JFC’s role is to (i) provide a 
safety net to respond to risks from unexpected circumstances97 such 
as natural disasters; (ii) support start-ups; and (iii) facilitate 
revitalization and foreign expansion of businesses. 98   JFC also 
extends loans directly to businesses.99   As of March 2019, JFC’s 
loans to SMEs represented 4.2% of all SME loans in the economy.  
JFC disbursed loans to 0.88 million microenterprises, about half of 
which were sole proprietors 100 —86.7% of these loans were not 
supported by any collateral.101   The JFC and the CGCs form the 
Credit Supplementation System.102  
 
96 In 1958, the insurance function was transferred from the government to 
the Small Business Credit Insurance Corporation.  Atsuo Kuroda, Credit 
Supplementation System for Unlocking SME and Startup Access to Finance, The 
Case of Japan, in UNLOCKING SME FINANCE IN ASIA, ROLES OF CREDIT RATING 
AND CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES 247 (Naoyuki Yoshino & Farhad Taghizadeh-
Hesary eds., 2019).  
97 The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry decided to activate the 
safety net guarantee for the companies suffering from declining sales due to the 
coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and to widen the types of beneficiaries 
covered by the safety net guarantee.  See MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUS. 
(METI), Measure for Supporting SME’s Affected by Novel Coronavirus to be 
Taken (Designation of Areas Subject to No. 4 Safety Nets for Financing 
Guarantee) (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2019/02/20200228001/20200228001.html 
[https://perma.cc/D9H9-V7UW]; see also MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUS. 
(METI), We Will Take Measures for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Related 
to the New Coronavirus Infection (Mar. 3, 2020), 
https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2019/03/20200303002/20200303002.html 
[https://perma.cc/WV4R-KU85]. 
98 JAPAN FIN. CORP. (JFC) 2018 Japan Finance Corporation Annual Report 
6 (2018), https://www.jfc.go.jp/n/english/pdf/jfc2018e_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/57FV-5KVW].  
99 In contrast, the SBA pulled back from making direct loans in the mid-
1980s acknowledging that the private market is more efficient in deciding which 
loans should be extended.  See Craig et al., supra note 1, at 350. 
100 JFC 2019 Japan Finance Corporation Annual Report (2019), 
https://www.jfc.go.jp/n/english/pdf/jfc2019e_3.pdf.  See also JFC, supra note 98. 
101 JFC 2019, supra note 100. 
102 See JFC, supra note 98, at 52. 
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Figure 2: The Credit Supplementation System103 
Since its inception, the beneficiaries of the Credit 
Supplementation System have expanded.  New economic sectors 
have been added, and the caps on borrower size and guarantee limits 
have increased.104   Only certain types of SMEs, operating in the 
agriculture, forestry, fishery, or finance sectors remain ineligible.105  
International Perspectives 
Many guarantee schemes were set up decades ago, during 
which their effect on access to credit has grown.  Globally, Japan and 
Korea are the leaders in the use of credit guarantees. Guaranteed loans 
represent a large share of their GDP—7.3% in Japan and 6.2% in 
Korea in 2011.106  By contrast, credit guarantees represent only 0.4% 
 
103 JAPAN FED’N CREDIT GUAR. CORPS., Credit Guarantee System In Japan 
2020 5 (2020), 
https://www.zenshinhoren.or.jp/document/Credit_Guarantee_System_in_Japan_2
020.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3TV-RVEC] (last accessed Apr. 17, 2021). 
104 CREDIT GUAR. CORP. TOKYO, Annual Report 2019 3, 5 (2019), 
https://www.cgc-tokyo.or.jp/about/public/annualreport2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7FXQ-KTWJ]. 
105 The ineligible economic sectors are set out in in the enforcement 
regulation under the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act.  
See JFC, supra note 98, at 7.  
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of GDP in the United States, and less than 0.1% of GDP in Canada.107  
The global median was 0.11% of GDP in 2014.108  On average, one 
third of Japanese SMEs obtain loans guaranteed through the Credit 
Supplementation System.109  Globally, the proportion of a country’s 
SMEs with a loan covered by a credit guarantee averages less than 
2%.110   The percentage of Japanese SMEs that obtain guaranteed 
loans is even higher in some areas.111  For instance, the Tokyo CGC 
guarantees loans to 42.6% SMEs operating in the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area, 74.2% of which have fewer than five 
employees.112  
A set of globally recognized principles have been 
promulgated to guide the establishment and operation of guarantee 
schemes.  The overarching objective of these principles is to ensure 
financial sustainability of schemes, for their administrators to apply 
proper risk mitigation mechanisms, and the fee structure to reflect the 
riskiness of the loan applicant.  In 2015, the World Bank published 
Principles for Public Credit Guarantee Schemes for SMEs, which 
cover four aspects:  (i) legal and regulatory framework; (ii) corporate 
governance; (iii) operational framework; and (iv) monitoring and 
evaluation.113  
The first area covers the Principles relevant to this article.  
Principle 8 recommends that schemes implement an effective and 
comprehensive risk management framework that identifies risks 
related to its operation, and use credit risk mitigation techniques, such 
as counter-guarantees (insurance).  Principle 11 recommends that 
schemes provide partial coverage of losses upon default, and that the 
 
107 Id. at 12, 46; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data (FRED), 
Gross Domestic Product for Canada, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (July 2, 2020), 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MKTGDPCAA646NWDB 
[https://perma.cc/2FXC-Q844]. 
108 Abraham & Schmukler, supra note 31. 
109 See Colacelli & Hong, supra note 9, at 51; Kuroda, supra note 96, at 
247.  
110 Abraham & Schmukler, supra note 31. 
111 Id. at 51.  
112  CREDIT GUAR. CORP. TOKYO, supra note 104, at 11–12. Over 90% of 
loans guaranteed by the Tokyo CGC are used to cover operating expenses. 
113 See WBG, Priciples for Public Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGSs) for 
SMEs, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/publication/principles-
for-public-credit-guarantee-schemes-cgss-for-smes [https://perma.cc/BMT4-
HY72] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020). 
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guarantee should be designed to comply with capital requirements for 
credit risk.  The coverage ratio should exceed 50% as any lower 
coverage might not be a sufficient incentive for lenders to extend 
credit.114  The Principles recommend that the fee reflect the riskiness 
of the particular guarantee, and should be adjustable to ensure 
financial sustainability of the scheme.115  
Most of the schemes were established prior to the adoption of 
the Principles.  Over the decades, their types, structures, and risk 
formulae have been shaped by various factors.  As a result, there is 
no universally recognized structure or product that they offer.  
Types of Credit Guarantee Schemes 
Guarantee schemes may be categorized based on different 
features of the products they offer.  Guarantees may be (i) available 
for portfolios or individual loans; (ii) wholly unsecured or require 
creditors to take collateral; (iii) covering a percentage of the 
outstanding amount (80–100%) or the actual loss after enforcement 
upon default, known as second-loss guarantees.  Credit guarantees 
may cover loans for working capital as well as investment.116  
Different factors affect the design of a guarantee scheme.  For 
instance, individual guarantees are used when the staff of the 
financial institution have particular expertise in assessing various 
risks, while a different risk management approach is necessary to 
guarantee portfolios.117  The individual approach is more appropriate 
for larger loans, while the portfolio approach is more cost-efficient 
for smaller loans or loans given to particular types of SMEs.118  
The entities that issue guarantees may be:  (i) public; (ii) 
public-private; or (iii) private.  The first type is an important policy 
 
114 Id. at 20. 
115 Id. at 38. 
116 Guarantees for leasing, trade finance, and supply chain finance 
products are provided as well.  For instance, Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC) provides export and import loans as well as guarantees to 
businesses, including SMEs.  See OCED, supra note 92, at 25.  
117 Thorsten Beck et al., The Typology of Partial Credit Guarantee Funds 




118 WBG, supra note 113, at 36. 
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tool of a government, and it is the main focus of this article.119  
Guarantee schemes can be administered by:  (i) international 
organizations; (ii) governments; (iii) corporations; or (iv) mutual 
guarantee associations.  The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) Development Credit Authority’s partial 
credit guarantees are an example of an international scheme that aims 
to promote lending in underserved markets.120  International schemes 
are often accompanied by technical assistance to upgrade the 
participating lenders’ credit origination and risk management 
skills.121  Corporate schemes are funded and operated by the private 
sector, such as banks and chambers of commerce.  Lastly, mutual 
guarantee associations are private sector schemes formed and 
managed by borrowers who contribute to a common fund that 
guarantees the repayment of a loan given to a member of the 
association.   
The risk sharing formulae also differ.  In one type of 
arrangement, the guarantor shares the losses pari passu with the 
lender or its right to recovery may be wholly subordinated to the 
lender.122  These formulae may be affected by regulatory aspects, 
such as the rules to prevent state aid within the European Union that 
requires losses to be sustained proportionally between the scheme 
operator and participating lenders. 123   Schemes employ loss-
mitigation tools, such as counter-guarantees.  If these counter-
guarantees or insurance are provided by governmental institutions, 
that may enhance the credibility and reputation of the scheme.124 
 
119 CUSMANO, supra note 46, at 16. 
120 U.S. AGENCY INT’L DEV., Development Credit Authority: Putting Local 
Wealth to Work, 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/DCA_One-
Pager_Financial_Partner.pdf [https://perma.cc/HB8M-LRLA] (last accessed Oct. 
22, 2020).  
121 Calice, supra note 8. 
122 OECD, supra note 92, at 13. 
123 See Commission Notice on the Application of Articles 87 and 88 of the 
EC Treaty to State Aid in the Form of Guarantees  155/02), O.J., June 20, 2008, 
at C155/10, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:155:0010:0022:en:PDF 
[https://perma.cc/TPD9-2PJM] [hereinafter Commission Notice] (“First-loss 
guarantees, where losses are first attributed to the guarantor and only then to the 
lender, will be regarded as possibly involving aid.”)  
124 CUSMANO, supra note 46, at 8. 
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Some schemes are designed to operate specifically in 
conjunction with loans secured by personal property collateral.  For 
instance, the World Bank Group supports the Second Loss Partial 
Credit Guarantee program, which is a structure that covers the risk of 
lenders that the proceeds from enforcement of a security interest will 
not suffice to fully satisfy the secured obligation.125  This may occur 
because the borrower obstructed the enforcement process or illiquid 
secondary markets preclude the sale of the collateral for a reasonable 
price.  This structure incentivizes the lender to develop expertise in 
valuing, monitoring, and liquidating the collateral because it may 
claim payment on the guarantee only when the enforcement process 
was frustrated or the collateral sold for value less than the estimated 
liquidation value at the time of origination. 126   However, this 
guarantee scheme structure has some downsides.  Foremost, covering 
losses caused by an inefficient enforcement framework may become 
a disincentive to the government to seriously consider reforming that 
framework to expedite enforcement of security interests.  
Guarantee schemes in many developed economies are almost 
fully funded by fees and recoveries of collateral on defaulted loans.127  
Between 2016 and 2019, the United States Small Business 
Administration (SBA) did not require any government funding to 
subsidize the cost of its loan guaranty programs.128  Even the largest 
of these subsidies amounts to less than one thousandth of one percent 
of U.S. GDP.129  Similarly, in Canada, even the largest shortfalls of 
the Canada Small Business Financing Program, which offers 85% 
credit guarantees on SME loans, amounted to only three thousandth 
 
125 See also Second Loss Partial Credit Guarantee: Unlocking the Potential 
of Small and Medium Enterprises with an Innovative, Risk-Sharing Financing 
Solution, WBG, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/362121537458541440/SLPCG-
Brochure-Jun11-hi-res.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW5N-XZ5G] (last accessed Oct. 
22, 2020).  
126 Id. 
127 CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41146, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 7(A) 
LOAN GUARANTY PROGRAM  21 (2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41146.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/59C7-TPCB]. 
128 Id.  From 2010 to 2015, the SBA received annual subsidies of between 
$45 million and $316 million. 
129 Id.  In 2013, the SBA received $316.3 million in total subsidies for its 
loan guaranty programs.  The US GDP in 2013 was $16.69 trillion.  See United 
States, WORLD BANK DATA,  https://data.worldbank.org/country/US 
[https://perma.cc/ZVW9-STRD] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020). 
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of one percent of its GDP.130   Although the schemes are usually 
subsidized from public resources, only a few disclose their financial 
data transparently.131 
The optimal credit guarantee fee should be sensitive to 
macroeconomic fluctuations as well as to loan applicants’ 
creditworthiness.132  To incentivize SMEs to improve their financial 
health and to avoid moral hazard, the fee should be commensurate to 
the SME risk profile.133  To promote borrowing during a recession or 
crisis, the fee should decrease to accommodate SMEs’ lower output 
levels and higher default risk ratio.134  During an economic boom, 
complementary to contractionary monetary policy, the fee should 
increase to reduce demand and discourage aggressive lending to 
prevent the creation of a bubble.135 
Regulatory Treatment of Guaranteed Loans 
Regulatory treatment of loans is an important consideration 
for lenders, including when deciding on the type of security to to 
mitigate risks.  Loans guaranteed by a qualified scheme may provide 
a regulatory benefit that may not be available for loans that are 
unsecured or secured with some collateral.  This benefit may thus 
provide an economic incentive to utilize a particular credit risk 
mitigant.  A survey of European banks found that one of the reasons 
for the use of public guarantees is capital relief since the portion of 
the loan covered by a guarantee may be subject to a lower risk 
weight. 136   Another study on the impact of public guarantees in 
Western Europe revealed that about half of the banks that the study 
 
130 See Canada GDP, TRADING ECON., 
https://tradingeconomics.com/canada/gdp [https://perma.cc/C9JX-LCJB] (last 
accessed Oct. 22, 2020) (stating that the shortfall peaked at CAD 48.6 million in 
FY 2008-09).  The Canadian GDP in 2009 was $1.37 trillion. 
131 Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary et al., A Model For Calculating The Optimal 
Credit Guarantee Fee for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (Asian Dev. Bank 
Inst.,  Working Paper No. 1045, Nov. 2019), 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/541041/adbi-wp1045.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2PXT-2K3K].  
132 Id. at 2. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 2–3. 
135 Id. at 2. 
136 Chatzouz et al., supra note 93, at 33.   
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covered reported that capital relief provided by guarantees is an 
important consideration for their use.137 
Depending on how the Basel Accords are domestically 
implemented, guarantees may reduce risk weights. 138   Some 
guarantees may benefit from regulatory relief only if the payment 
does not require the lender first having to pursue the borrower.  Thus, 
this benefit would not accrue if the guarantee were designed as a 
second loss guarantee requiring the lender to first pursue the borrower 
and only then claim a payment for any outstanding losses.  
In Japan, two separate capital requirements regimes apply 
based on the type of financial institution:  (i) the international (Basel 
Accord) standard applies to banks with overseas branches; and (ii) 
the domestic standard applies to other banks.139  Though they differ 
in some ways, they share the same methods in the calculation of the 
capital relief. Of sixty-four regional banks, fourty-five use the 
standardized approach to calculate capital charges, as do thirty-eight 
of fourty second regional banks.140  These two types of banks utilize 




137 Id. at 5. 
138 A reduction may be available whether the financial institution utilizes the 
standardized or internal-ratings based approach.  Id. at 34. 
139 JFSA Notification No. 19 of 2006 (Ginkouhou Dai14jouno2 no Kiteini 
Motoduki, Ginkouga Sono Hoyuusuru Sisantou ni Terashi Jikosihon no Juujituno 
Joukyouga Tekisetu dearukadouka wo Handansurutameno Kijun), 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/policy/basel_ii/ginkou1-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB83-
XXB8] (last accessed Nov. 3, 2020) (Japan). 
140About Regional Banks: Outline of Regional Banks, REG’L BANKS ASS’N 
JAPAN, https://www.chiginkyo.or.jp/app/contents.php?category_id=17 
[https://perma.cc/6HW3-2U2W] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020); English TOP, 2ND 
ASS’N REG’L BANKS, https://www.dainichiginkyo.or.jp/en.html 
[https://perma.cc/W3E3-H642] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020). 
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Figure 3: Number of Banks Using Standardized Approach 
 
Figure 4: Use of Credit Guarantees According to the Type of the Bank 
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Along with credit derivatives,141 depending on the nature of 
the issuer and their terms, guarantees may qualify as unfunded credit 
protection.142  For a scheme funded by a government with a AAA 
rating, the risk weight may be reduced to zero.143  After announcing 
and supporting the measures to encourage SME loan restructuring, in 
December of 2008, the risk weight of the guaranteed amount of the 
loan was reduced to zero.144  During the COVID-19 pandemic, banks 
can assign zero risk weights to loans covered by public guarantee 
schemes and draw down their high-quality liquid assets below the 
minimum liquidity coverage ratio requirement.  
Principle 11 of the World Bank Group Principles for Public 
Credit Guarantee Schemes for SMEs recommends that “The 
guarantees should be . . . designed to ensure compliance with the 
relevant prudential requirements for lenders, in particular with capital 
requirements for credit risk.”  The World Bank further explains that 
credit guarantees should be designed to meet the parameters 
prescribed by the Basel Accords to provide capital relief 
corresponding to the proportion of the credit exposure covered by the 
guarantee as well as to comply with the provisioning rules. 145  
Depending on the implementation of the Basel Accords, the structure 
of the guarantee may thus influence the capital treatment of the 
guaranteed loan, which in turn could be an incentive or a disincentive 
for regulated financial institutions to utilize a particular type of 
guarantee.  Requiring some collateral as a condition of issuing a 
guarantee should enhance the recovery rate of the loan without any 
negative impact on the capital relief benefit.  
After the adoption of the 2009 SME Financing Facilitation 
Act, Japanese financial institutions could exclude restructured SME 
loans from non-performing loans.146  This option is available if the 
 
141 See also Castellano & Dubovec, Bridging the Gap, supra note 5, at 63–
85. 
142 Chatzouz et al., supra note 93, at 33–34. 
143 CUSMANO, supra note 46, at 28. 
144 See Harada et al., supra note 61, at 218–219.  Under the Emergency Credit 
Guarantee Program, introduced to ameliorate the effect of the credit crisis in 
October 2008, the risk weight of the guaranteed loans was reduced from 10% to 0.  
See Ono et al., supra note 49, at 153. 
145 See WBG, supra note 113, at 21. 
146 The FSA’s Supervisory Guidelines were modified to the same effect.  
Nobuyoshi Yamori, The Effects of the Financing of the Financial Facilitation Act 
After the Global Financial Crisis: Has the Easing of Repayment Conditions 
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financial institution expects the loans to perform within five years.  
Even though the Act ceased to have effect in March 2013, financial 
institutions have continued to grant requests for restructuring of loans, 
accepting 95% of applications. 147   The Act, and the practice it 
fostered, was criticized as the Japanese government using its 
discretion to soften prudential regulation that sustains zombie 
companies. 148   This policy benefited financially weak financial 
institutions and their borrowers that would otherwise have been 
liquidated.149  
Operational Structure of the Japanese Credit Supplementation 
System 
The Japanese Credit Supplementation System has a two-
tiered structure that includes the JFC and prefectural CGCs.  This 
structure is composed of a web of contractual relationships.  
Prefectural CGCs enter into blanket agreements with financial 
institutions that govern the general parameters of those relationships 
for any future lending activities.  The Federation of CGCs issues a 
template, which may be modified by the prefectural CGCs, although 
that has not been common.  For a guaranteed loan, the financial 
institution and the CGCs enter into a contract specific to that loan.  
Naturally, the financial institution and the borrower enter into a 
separate loan agreement.  Finally, the CGC enters into an agreement 
with the borrower.  
There are two ways in which an application for a guarantee 
may be generated:  (i) by the prospective borrower who applies 
directly with the CGCs, or (ii) by the financial institution on behalf 
of the prospective borrower.150  The following is the usual process 
from the application for a guarantee to its satisfaction:  
 
Revived Underperforming Firms?, J. RISK FIN. MGMT. 3–4 (2019); Kimie Harada 
et al., Japan’s Financial Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis, 7 
J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 51, 62 (2015).  
147 Yamori, supra note 146, at 4.  
148 Id. at 5.  
149 See Imai, supra note 52, at 11.   
150 Ono et al., supra note 49, at 152. 
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(1) SME (borrower) applies for a credit guarantee from the 
CGC directly or indirectly through a financial institution 
(lender). 
(2) If approved (the CGC assesses the SME’s 
creditworthiness), SME and CGC enter into an agreement.  
(3) Upon satisfactory completion of its due diligence, the 
lender enters into a contract and extends a loan to the SME. 
(4) CGC and the financial institution enter into a contract 
related to the specific loan (the two already entered into an 
umbrella agreement). 
(5) CGC obtains insurance for the guarantee from the Japan 
Finance Corporation (JFC) under a blanket contract 
previously entered into. 
(6) SME pays the guarantee fee to CGC. 
(7) CGC pays the insurance premium to JFC. 
(8) SME 
            (8a) repays the loan and the transaction terminates, or 
            (8b) defaults. 
(9) If the latter happens, CGC is informed and verifies that a 
default occurred.  
(10) CGC pays the guaranteed amount (up to 80%) within 90 
days and subrogates to the rights of the financial institution. 
(11) JFC pays the insurance money to CGC. 
(12) CGC and the financial institution begin enforcement of 
their rights against the SME. 
(13) After the CGC recovers from the borrower to cover the 
amount of the guarantee, it remits any excess to the JFC.   
 
The JFC provides different types of general and special 
insurance products to CGCs.  These products effectively allow the 
CGCs to transfer the credit risk to the JFC.  Special insurance 
products are directed at transactions where the SME faces some 
unpredictable challenges, such as a natural disaster or to support new 
business opportunities.151  JFC provides specific types of insurance 
to facilitate the use of asset-based lending, including to facilitate 
restructuring of a business in insolvency.  An asset-based lending 
 
151 Kuroda, supra note 96, at 255.  
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(ABL) guarantee was introduced in August 2007.152  The insurance 
ratio is 80% and the JFC charges a fixed rate of 0.46%.153  However, 
the ABL guarantee is available only when the loan is secured with 
liquid collateral, which is defined to include ordinary receivables 
generated from sales of goods, receivables in the form of promissory 
notes, electronically recorded receivables and inventory.154  
Collateral thus plays a role in the ABL guarantee.  Overall, 
collateralization affects the amount of guarantees that may be issued 
by CGCs, which is limited to 80 million Japanese Yen (JPY).  
General guarantees may be extended up to 200 to 400 million JPY 
depending on the type of borrower.155  
 
Figure 5: Satisfaction of a Loan Covered by a Credit Guarantee 
Some earlier studies showed understaffing of the CGCs and 
the perceived inability to adequately assess guarantee applications.  
In the Tokyo Guarantee Corporation, the number of approved 
guarantees per employee was 168 in 2011, while the ratio for 
employees of private sector banks was forty to eighty loan 
 
152 Kigyou no Tayouna Sikin Choutatu Shuhou ni Kansuru Jittai Chousa 
[Research on Diverse Fundraising Methods of Company] 5 (Ministry Econ., 
Trade & Indus. (METI) Rsch. Paper, 2019). 
153 Kuroda, supra note 96, at 254.  
154 The Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act, Law No. 
264 of 1950, arts. 3–4; Order for Enforcement of the Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprise Credit Insurance Act, Cabinet Order No. 350 of 1950, art. 7. 
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approvals. 156   A 2016 World Bank assessment of sixty credit 
guarantee schemes found that the global median level is twenty-
nine.157  
In the Japan Revitalization Strategy 2015, the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Agency was mandated to “consider credit-
guarantee system’s direction to promote active support by financial 
institutions to SMEs.”  Shortly thereafter, the Financial Working 
Group was established within the Small and Medium Enterprise 
Policy Making Council, and a year later issued a report “Establishing 
a Sustainable Credit Enhancement System to Support the 
Development of Business of SMEs and Small Enterprises.”158  This 
report recognized the important role of credit guarantees in SME 
development, contributing to productivity and regional revitalization, 
but also highlighted the need to minimize side effects. 159   The 
Financial Working Group considered the potential effect of reducing 
the guarantee coverage blanketly from 100% to 80%, but concluded 
that such a reduction would not have an impact on the behavior of 
financial institutions in terms of fostering SME development.  A 
significantly larger reduction might have that effect, but that would 
risk reduction in overall lending.160  Notably, the Tokyo CGC had 
already introduced an 80% cap in October 2007.161 
The 2018 reforms institutionalized the maximum coverage of 
80% of the outstanding loan amount, with the exception of loans to 
start-ups and microenterprises and for loans extended during a 
crisis.162  Presently, financial institutions have two options as to how 
to share the risk of loss with CGCs:  (i) the partial guarantee method 
under which 80% of the outstanding amount is guaranteed and paid 
upon satisfaction of the prescribed conditions; and (ii) the burden 
charge method under which 100% is guaranteed and paid upon 
 
156 Ono et al., supra note 49, at 155. 
157 See Calice, supra note 8. 
158 Nobuyoshi Yamori, Japan’s Credit Guarantee System Reform of 2017 
and New Functions of Credit Guarantee Associations 2–3 (Rsch. Inst. Econ. & 
Bus. Admin. (RIEB), Kobe Univ. Discussion Paper Series DP2018-03, Feb. 13, 
2018), https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2018-03.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZWW4-JRMK].  
159 Id. at 3.  
160 Id. at 4. 
161 CREDIT GUAR. CORP. TOKYO, supra note 104, at 10. 
162 Colacelli & Hong, supra note 9, at annex 1. 
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satisfaction of the prescribed conditions, but later the financial 
institution pays back a 20% contribution to the CGC.163  A 2019 IMF 
Working Paper highlighted that the 80% coverage is still considered 
high.164  
If the SME defaults and owes 10 million JPY on a guaranteed 
loan, the CGC covers 80%, which corresponds to 8 million JPY.  The 
JFC insures 70–90% (in many cases 80%) of the CGC’s guarantee 
which corresponds to 5.6 million to 7.2 million JPY.165   
 
Figure 6: Risk Sharing Scheme 
 
The operations of CGCs are financed primarily by credit 
guarantee fees, returns on the investment of CGC assets and 
insurance payments from the JFC.  In addition, the national 
government and local governments, including the Improvement and 
Promotion of Business Support for SMEs, also provide financial 
 
163 JAPAN FED’N CREDIT GUAR. CORPS., supra note 103, at 9.  
164 Colacelli & Hong, supra note 9, at 9. 
165 Kuroda, supra note 96, at 262. 
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support to the CGCs to strengthen their financial positions. Financial 
institutions also provide contributions that are tax deductible.166  
The guarantee fee is determined at the outset of the transaction, 
so it does not take into account any changes in the creditworthiness 
of the borrower.167  Additional fees are levied upon default.  In 2006, 
a new system for JFC to collect fees was introduced categorizing 
borrowers into nine buckets, which was repealed in the aftermath of 
the 2008 credit crisis when the system reverted to a flat 0.75%–0.8% 
fee irrespective of the riskiness of the borrower.168  Later, the system 
categorizing borrowers into nine buckets was re-introduced.169  
Credit Guarantee Programs During Crises 
Guarantee schemes have played an important role during 
various crises.170  The underlying purpose of some schemes is to act 
as a countercyclical mechanism during crises when financial 
institutions restrict lending.  Unsurprisingly, their role has been 
amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Recognizing that 
financial institutions are likely to respond to the uncertain economic 
recovery by limiting lending to reduce risk, the COVID-19 related 
programs seek to avoid the sharp contraction.171 
A slew of measures to financially support businesses has been 
rolled out to address the negative economic impact of COVID-19.172  
The Bank for International Settlements, IMF, and the World Bank 
have encouraged regulators to maintain financial stability, market 
 
166 Colacelli & Hong, supra note 9, at 12. 
167 Chau-Jung Kuo et al., Evaluating Guarantee Fees for Loans to Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises, 37 SMALL BUS. ECON. 205, 207 (2011).   
168 Colacelli, supra note 9, at annex 1. 
169 Kuroda, supra note 96, at 261. 
170See KLAPPER & ZAIDI, supra note 34, at 19 (stating that already existing 
guarantee scheme provide a read distribution channel for credit).   
171 Patrizia Baudino, Public Guarantees for Bank Lending in Response to 
the Covid-19 Pandemic, FIN. STABILITY INST. BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS 1 (Apr. 
2020), https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsibriefs5.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ6T-KMSE]. 
172 For an overview of the implemented measures, see Tackling Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) Contributing to a Global Effort, OECD (July 15, 2020), 
https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/coronavirus-covid-19-sme-
policy-responses-04440101/#section-d1e7906 [https://perma.cc/36W6-AKDP]; 
Tatiana Didier et al., Financing Firms in Hibernation During the COVID-19 
Pandemic (WBG, Pol’y Rsch. Working Paper No. 9236, May 1, 2020). 
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functionality, and credit flow while continuing to uphold minimum 
prudential standards consistent with international standards.173  Key 
elements of measures designed to strike the necessary balance 
between effective responses and requisite prudence include defining 
targeted beneficiaries, loan terms, and duration of the program.174  
Setting a finite duration can limit market distortions when the 
programs end.175  Similar calls and counterbalancing measures with 
respect to the use of guarantee schemes are noticeably absent.  
Credit guarantees deployed during the COVID-19 pandemic 
have been more generous.  A relatively large proportion of these 
programs cover 100% of any loss sustained by the lender.176  Some 
programs, including those in Canada and the United States, offer 
(partial) loan forgiveness for meeting program targets, such as using 
the loan to pay employee salaries.  The United States Paycheck 
Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act allocated 321 
billion USD for forgivable loans and guarantees to help small 
businesses retain workers.177  In a complimentary program, the Main 
Street Business Lending Program (MSLP), the United States 
Treasury invested 75 billion USD in a special purpose vehicle, 
established by the Federal Reserve to guarantee 95% of the par value 
of loans under the MSLP.178 
Over the decades, the Japanese Credit Supplementation 
System has been deployed to tackle the economic downturns caused 
by several crises.  During the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, as 
well as the Asian credit crisis of the 1990s, the government utilized 
credit guarantees to support SMEs through the Special Credit 
 
173 See Id. at 1, 2; IMF, COVID-19: The Regulatory and Supervisory 
Implications for the Banking Sector (Joint IMF-World Bank Staff Position Note, 
May 2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33793 
[https://perma.cc/7XTA-MVHQ]. 
174 Baudino, supra note 171, at 1–2. 
175 Id. at 5. 
176 See Id. tbl. 1, at 2 (noting that Hong Kong introduced low-interest loans 
for SMEs with 100%government guarantee (HK$50 billion), and Germany 
expanded guaranteed loans for companies and credit insurers, including 100% 
guarantees for some loans, increasing the total volume by at least €757 billion 
(24%of GDP)). 
177 See IMF, Policy Responses to COVID-19, 
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 
[https://perma.cc/TW7G-CFMP] (last visited Oct. 22, 2020). 
178 Baudino, supra note 171, at 6. 
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Guarantee Program for Financial Stability.179  A report published by 
the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency acknowledged the 
important role the Credit Supplementation System plays to support 
the financing of SMEs, particularly in times of crisis.180  However, 
the crisis program was characterized by lenient qualification 
conditions as a result of which, only a few applications were 
rejected. 181   Furthermore, this policy incentivized financial 
institutions to restructure the unguaranteed loans as guaranteed loans.  
This practice is now prohibited by the contract between CGCs and 
financial institutions. 182   Thus, the program has not resulted in 
channeling of new credit to SMEs, and increased the moral hazard.183  
Guarantee programs implemented post the 1998 Asian crisis 
have been equally ineffective.  For instance, the Special Guarantee 
Program for Financial Stability increased the availability of credit, 
but it suppressed profitability of borrowers.184  After the nation’s bad-
loan problem in the 1990s, FSA was established in 1998 under the 
Ministry of Finance Banking Bureau to administer rule-based strict 
policy.  However, this policy led to homogenization of Japanese 
financial institutions 185  and reinforcement of their reliance on 
guarantees.  In October 2008, a guarantee scheme to support SMEs 
affected by inflationary movements in the price of raw materials and 
the recession triggered by the global financial crisis was 
established.186  Later, the scheme was expanded to the Emergency 
Guarantee System providing a financial safety net.  The total 
utilization of the system reached over 27 trillion JPY in March 2011 
when it ended.187  Another example of addressing a problem caused 
 
179 Kuroda, supra note 96, at 247.   
180 See SME Credit Supplement System, supra note 37. 
181 Uesugi, supra note 49, at 460. 
182 The Agreement on the Credit Guarantee Corporation Transaction, art. 3. 
183 Hashimoto et al., supra note 71, at 15. 
184 See Uesugi, supra note 49, at 460 (stating that one of the reasons was the 
moral hazard effect exacerbated by the non-existent collateral requirements).  
185 Hashimoto et al., supra note 71, at 15. 
186 SME Financing Measures Such as the Creation of an Emergency 
Guarantee for Economic Response, SMALL & MEDIUM ENTER. AGENCY (Feb. 5, 
2010), https://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/kinyu/2010/100205KeikiSupport.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4UAY-FADX]. 
187 Kaori Nakano & Shinsuke Nakanishi, Lehman Shock Gono Chushokigyo 
Kinyusiensaku—Chushokigyou Kinyuenkatukahou To Kinkyuhoshou Seido 
[Policy to Support SME Financing after the Global Financial Crisis—SME 
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by an unpredictable event was the scheme implemented in the 
aftermath of the great earthquake in March 2011.  The scheme 
supported around 3 trillion JPY of business loans.188  In April 2018, 
the Crisis-related Guarantee Scheme was established.189  In March 
2020, SMEs suffering from the COVID-19 pandemic were listed as 
eligible.190  
In the second supplementary budget proposal for the 2020 
fiscal year, 12 trillion JPY is proposed to be allocated to strengthen 
business cash flows as a countermeasure to the COVID-19 effects.191  
Three trillion JPY will be invested in financing support through 
private financial institutions, including for credit guarantees and 
credit insurance.192  There is a wide range of support available for 
SMEs affected by COVID-19, including safety net guarantees No. 4 
and No. 5, and the Crisis-related Guarantee Scheme.  The Tokyo 
CGC reported that the amount of guarantees issued from April to 
August 2020 was 21 trillion JPY.193  This exceeds the amount of 
 
Finance Facilitation Act and Emergency Guarantee System], 337 RIPPOU TO 
CHOUSA 62 (2013).  
188 RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY, Fukkou no Torikumi to Shoseido [Efforts to 
Reconstruction and Systems], https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-
cat7/sub-cat7-2/20190703_sanko2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J6X-3GD9] (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2020).   
189 See Kiki Kanren Hoshou Seido [Guarantee System Related to 
Emergency], SMALL & MEDIUM ENTER. AGENCY, 
https://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/kinyu/sefu_net_crisis.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3MTN-9VDS] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).  
190 Singata Corna Virus Kansensho ni Kakaru Chushokigyosha Taisaku wo 
Koujimasu [We are Implementing Support to SMEs Regarding the Situation of 
COVID-19], MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUS. (METI), 
https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2019/03/20200311007/20200311007.html 
[https://perma.cc/L87N-ZG8T] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).  
191 Id.  
192 Reiwa2nendo Dai2ji Hoseiyosan no Jigyou Gaiyou [Brief Introduction of 
2nd Supplementary Budget for FY 2020], MINISTRY ECON., TRADE & INDUS. 
(METI), 
https://www.meti.go.jp/main/yosan/yosan_fy2020/hosei/pdf/hosei2_yosan_pr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4BDA-BPEY] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).  
193 Shinyouhoshou Jisseki no suii [Transition in Credit Guarantee Issuance], 
JAPAN FED. CREDIT GUAR. CORPS., 
https://www.zenshinhoren.or.jp/document/hosho_jisseki.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U26Z-QPP9] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020). 
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guarantees issued in the fiscal year in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis.  
Thus, the credit guarantee system plays an extremely 
important role as public policy to support SMEs in a crisis where 
swift government support is needed.  These functions and features of 
guarantees in a crisis differ from guarantees issued in ordinary times.  
The following table compares guarantees used in ordinary times with 
guarantees during crises.  
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V. EFFECTS OF GUARANTEES  
Public guarantees cause various macroeconomic and 
microeconomic effects.  Some studies identified tax revenue and 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss3/1
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maintaining employment as positive macroeconomic effects. 194  
Others found growth in assets, sales and employment.195  In contrast, 
the OECD has identified a number of market distortions that the use 
of credit guarantees may generate.  These include (i) channeling of 
funds to unproductive borrowers;196 (ii) prolonging the existence of 
(zombie) companies that should be liquidated;197 (iii) preventing the 
diversification of various financing sources;198 (iv) disadvantaging 
companies that are ineligible to access credit guarantees; and (v) 
creating contingent fiscal liabilities.199  
The design of the Japanese Credit Supplementation System is 
prone to creating these negative effects.  The OECD found that it 
hinders market-based financing, creates disincentives to grow, and 
delays restructuring of viable businesses. 200   Studies by local 
commentators found that SMEs that benefit from guaranteed loans 
experience declines in their financial performance, and the asset 
composition of guarantee beneficiaries changes very little, which 
 
194 See Chatzouz et al., supra note 93, at 11 (noting that in the United States, 
the SBA program benefitted employment in low-income areas only); Craig et al., 
supra note 1, at 346, 357 (describing this impact as significantly higher in markets 
with small businesses owned by minorities); Ben R. Craig et al., Small Firm 
Credit Market Discrimination, Small Business Administration Guaranteed 
Lending, and Local Market Economic Performance, 613 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. SOC. SCI. 73 (2007) (advancing research on minority entrepreneurship).  
195 A study of the EU market found that within two years after receipt of a 
guaranteed loan, the growth of SME beneficiaries exceeded those whose loans 
were not guaranteed in a number of metrics: assets by 19.6%, sales by 14.8% and 
employment by 16.9%.  Fabio Bertoni et al., Econometric Study on the Impact of 
EU Loan Guarantee Financial Instruments on Growth and Jobs of SMEs 9 (Eur. 
Inv. Fund Working Paper No. 2019/54, 2019). 
196 In Chile, guarantees increase delinquency rates by 1.5% within the first 
12 months, and by 2% within 24 months as compared to unguaranteed loans.  
Kevin Cowan et al., The Effect of Credit Guarantees on Credit Availability and 
Delinquency Rates, 59 J. BANKING & FIN. 1, 3 (2015). 
197 See Commission Notice, supra note 123, at §2.2. 
198 See also USAID, FROM LAWS TO LOANS, supra note 19, at 37.  
199 Evaluating Publicly Supported Credit Guarantee Programmes for SMEs, 
OECD, at 9 (2017). 
200 Randall S. Jones & Myungkyoo Kim, Promoting the Financing of SME’s 
and Start-ups in Korea 12 (OECD Econ. Dep’t Working Papers No. 1162, Sept. 
16, 2014), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/promoting-the-financing-of-
smes-and-start-ups-in-korea_5jxx054bdlvh-en [https://perma.cc/3HGA-AG5K]. 
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suggests that guaranteed loans may be used to fund operating 
losses.201  
Businesses with great potential that may be informationally 
opaque are unable to access guaranteed loans.  Guarantee schemes 
have a tendency to support businesses with negative growth prospects, 
as long as they have a history of benefitting from guarantees.202  The 
continued availability of a guarantee, in its present structure, does not 
provide sufficient economic incentives to liquidate or restructure a 
struggling borrower and revive its business prospects.  The lending 
bank is incentivized to preserve the relationship it has built with the 
borrower, which liquidation would effectively terminate.  The CGC 
and JFC are public entities whose mission may be questioned if an 
increasing number of Japanese SMEs were liquidated.  Accordingly, 
the incentive structure is designed for the CGC and JFC to be 
reluctant to force liquidation of unviable borrowers. 
Japanese borrowers who secured the repayment of their loans 
with some collateral experience larger increases in profitability and 
improvement in their risk profile.203  The 2018 JFC Annual Report 
includes a story recounted by the honorary chairman of Kyocera 
Corporation, now a company publicly traded on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange.  Forty years ago, a local branch of JFC extended a loan to 
Kyocera secured with the machinery it was planning to buy in the 
future.204   This loan enabled Kyocera to grow its business to its 
present size.  This is a good illustration of the economic effect of 
lending secured with commercial collateral that the Credit 
Supplementation System used to enable. 
 
201 See Imai, supra note 52, at, 13.  See also Uesugi et al., supra note 49, at 
458, 479. 
202 See Jae Won Kang & Almas Heshmati, Effect of Credit Guarantee 
Policy on Survival and Performance of SMEs in Republic of Korea, 31 SMALL 
BUS. ECON. 445, 451-58 (2008); Atsushi Kakinuma & Shinsuke Nakanishi, Zaisei 
Futan no Shiten kara Mita Shinyou Hoshou ni Kansuru Ichi Kousatu 
[Consideration on Credit Guarantee Regarding the Public Financial Burden], 
KEIZAI NO PRISM 114, 140 (2013).  
203 See Arito Ono et al., The Effects of Collateral on Firm Performance, 26 
J. JAPANESE INT’L ECON. 84, 84–85 (2012) (describing how the lack of collateral 
reduces the incentive of the borrower to operate its business in the most efficient 
manner, and encourages asset substitution and dissipation); Ono et al., supra note 
49, at 154. 
204 See JFC, supra note 98, at 50. 
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A 2016 report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
contends that:  
in practical terms guarantees are not a substitute for 
being able to secure loans against collateral.  All the 
problems with unsecured lending exist with 
guarantees. All that a guarantee does is shift the risk, 
or some percentage of the risk, from the primary 
lenders, the banks, to the guarantors. . . . There is 
simply no substitute for reform of secured transactions 
systems if financial markets are to adequately fund 
small and medium sized businesses.205 
Borrowers and Lenders 
The availability and low cost of credit guarantees do not make 
market-based financing an economically attractive alternative in 
Japan.206  Even though market-based financing produces a number of 
positives for borrowers, the incentive structure steers them to 
guaranteed lending.  Furthermore, the incentive structure locks in the 
SME borrower within the Credit Supplementation System.  Put 
simply, business growth punishes the borrower because outgrowing 
its SME status makes it ineligible to participate in a guarantee scheme.  
Lenders have an incentive to preserve the SME status of their 
borrowers so as not to lose the benefit of the guarantee, without which 
lending becomes riskier.207  This distortion is one of the failures of 
size-dependent policies in Japan.208  
The statistics on the use of credit guarantees illustrate these 
failures.  Figure 7 documents that 95.6% of all guaranteed loans are 
under 80 million JPY, which is the maximum amount eligible for JFC 
insurance for loans that do not require any collateral.  Figure 8 
illustrates that 93.7% of all guaranteed loans are used for working 
 
205ASIAN DEV. BANK, CREDIT GUARANTEES: CHALLENGING THEIR ROLE IN 
IMPROVING ACCESS TO FINANCE IN THE PACIFIC REGION 9 (2016). 
206 Ono, Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees, supra note 67, at 942. 
207 Daisuke Tsuruta, SME Policies as a Barrier to Growth of SMEs, 54 
SMALL BUS. ECON 1067, 1076 (2020). 
208 Id. at 1072, 1100.  
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capital rather than investment.209  Accordingly, lenders extend loans 
that fall under the maximum that does not require taking any 
collateral, and borrowers use the loan proceeds to essentially 
maintain and preserve their business.  
 
Figure 7: The Amount of Guaranteed 
Loan 




While the guarantee scheme does not require lenders to ease 
the requirements to take collateral, guarantees result in lower 
collateral requirements.  The use of collateral for lending is 
predicated on the ability of the lender to administer the loan as well 
as value and monitor the collateral.  The Bank of Japan highlighted 
that the risk management for loans to middle-risk businesses in Japan 
must be strengthened.210  Inadequate practices and skills of this nature 
are also characteristic for CGCs and JFC.211  If the risk of the lender 
is 100% covered by a guarantee, even if the loan is secured by 
 
209 See JAPAN FED’N CREDIT GUAR. CORPS., Heisei 30 Nendo Sinyou 
Hoshou Riyoujoukyo [Usage of Credit Guarantee in FY2018], 
http://www.zenshinhoren.or.jp/document/riyo_jyokyo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U5XU-YP42] (last visited Oct. 24 2020).  
210 BANK OF JAPAN, supra note 54, at 84.  
211 The JFC does not perform any due diligence on the borrowers whose 
loans are guaranteed by the CGC, but does so for the loans it directly extends.  In 
the former case, the CGC and the lender assess the creditworthiness of the loan 
applicant.  
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collateral, the incentives to build capacity to administer and monitor 
such loans are reduced.212  This incentive is further reduced by the 
policy of CGCs that requires the application of less strict valuation 
methods when some collateral is taken.213  
The design of the Japanese guarantee scheme disincentivizes 
the building of skills necessary to administer secured loans and halts 
the transition to market-based financing.  The other major effect is to 
perpetuate the existence of zombie companies.  The 2013 Japan 
Revitalization Strategy set a goal to increase the percentage of non-
viable firms that should be liquidated and entry of new firms from 4–
5% (it was below 4% in 2012) to 10%.214  If a loan is guaranteed and 
restructuring has no effect on the continuation of the guarantee 
coverage, lenders have an economic incentive to inject liquidity into 
a zombie company that should have been liquidated.  If the loan is 
not guaranteed, there is more of an incentive to provide debt 
forgiveness.  Japanese lenders do not have an economic incentive to 
forgive the debt on which its potential losses are 80% or 100% 
guaranteed.215  It has been documented that the financial performance 
of borrowers whose indebtedness has been forgiven is superior as 
compared to those who receive an extension of the guaranteed loan.  
For those companies remaining in the guarantee scheme, leverage 
 
212 See Le Ngoc Dang & Anh Tu Chuc, Challenges in Implementing the 
Credit Guarantee Scheme for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: The Case of 
Viet Nam 14 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 941, 2019); Commission 
Notice, supra note 123, at § 3.2(c).  See also Arito Ono, Chushokigyo Muke 
Kashidasi wo Meguru Jishoubunseki: Genjou to Tenbou [Empirical Analysis on 
SME Lending: Present and Prospect], 30 KIN’YU KENKYU (2011) (describing 
how the financial institution may still bear the borrower’s credit risk when it has 
extended multiple loans to that same borrower); Ono & Uesugi, supra note 67, at 
935, 943. 
213 For receivables, CGC requires establishment of their value by applying a 
percentage that varies from 70% to 100% of average monthly sales that generate 
the receivables.  For inventories, the book value can be used.  Based on this 
evaluation, the applicable loan amount is 30% of the asset value.  The weight can 
be increased from 30% to 70%, such as when the asset’s value is objectively 
established by a third party.  See JAPAN FED’N CREDIT GUAR. CORPS., 
HOSHOUTSUKI YUSHI TORIATUKAI Q&A [HOW TO TREAT GUARANTEED LOANS 
Q&A] 232 (2011).  
214 See also Jones & Jin, supra note 62, at 11; Colacelli & Hong, supra note 
9, at 9. 
215 Ono & Yasuda, supra note 30, at 5. 
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increases, credit profiles deteriorate, and number of employees 
declines.216  
Realignment of the Incentives 
Lenders and borrowers have ample incentives to participate 
in the Credit Supplementation System.  Those are reinforced not only 
by the overall risk transfer to the guarantee scheme, but also the types 
of obligations that lenders must perform to claim protection.  
Examination of agreements between the CGC and lenders reveals that 
the agreements are not set up to induce lenders to build capacity to 
administer commercial loans.217  Several examples will illustrate.  
The lender is required to proceed with due diligence, in 
accordance with the agreement it signs with the CGC.218  In case of a 
deterioration of the credit facility or impending default, it would 
ordinarily inform the CGC and take any steps necessary to preserve 
recourse against the borrower.  After making a payment to the lender 
and subrogation to its rights, the CGC would pursue the borrower.  
The outstanding obligation owed by the borrower typically includes 
any amount the CGC paid on the guarantee, costs of enforcement, and 
damages for the breach of the agreement.  Since the guarantee 
generally covers 80% of the outstanding amount of the obligation, the 
 
216 Id. at 4.  
217 The Agreement on the Credit Guarantee Corporation Transaction is on 
file with the authors.  
218 Financial institutions are required to exercise the due diligence necessary 
to ensure the satisfaction of the credit guaranteed obligation under The Agreement 
on the Credit Guarantee Corporation Transaction, art. 9.  However, some research 
pointed out that the vagueness of the contract is resulting in the failure to exercise 
proper due diligence and monitoring by the financial institutions.  For further 
information, see Shunkichi Tsurui & Masayoshi Hirano, Shinyou Hosho Kyoukai 
Torihihiki no Houteki Saikousei (1)—21 Seiki heno Kinyu Henkaku no Nakadeno 
Kouteki Hoshou Kikan Torihiki to Kongo [Reconstructing a Framework of Legal 
Aspects of Transactions with Public Guarantee Organizations (1)—Transactions 
with Public Organizations amid the Deregulation on Japanese Banking Industry—
Designing a Desirable Future Framework], Komazawa Hougaku 9, 262–215 
(2009); Shunkichi Tsurui & Masayoshi Hirano, Shinyou Hosho Kyoukai Torhihiki 
no Houteki Saikousei (2)—21 Seiki heno Kinyu Henkaku no Nakadeno Kouteki 
Hoshou Kikan Torihiki to Kongo [Reconstructing a Framework of Legal Aspects 
of transactions with public guarantee organizations ⑴—Transactions with Public 
Organizations amid the Deregulation on Japanese Banking Industry—Designing a 
Desirable Future Framework], Komazawa Hougaku 9(2), 200–89 (2009). 
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lender is expected to enforce its rights against the borrower for the 
deficiency.  Accordingly, the borrower may be subject to two 
competing enforcement actions—CGC’s for the 80% of the 
outstanding amount it paid to the lender and the 20% of the 
outstanding amount, which represents the lender’s deficiency.  The 
borrower may not have sufficient assets to satisfy both claims, in 
which case their priority will matter. In the absence of a specific 
clause in an agreement between the CGC and the lender as to the 
priority of their respective claims, the ordinary first-in-time, first-in-
right principle would apply.  Accordingly, the deficiency claim of the 
lender would be satisfied in priority that further distorts its incentives 
in administering the loan.  One way in which the enhancement of 
practices of lenders may be induced is for the JFC and CGCs to 
consider including subordination clauses in their agreements with 
that would subordinate the deficiency claims of lenders to the 
enforcement of subrogation rights of the issuers of guarantees to the 
extent of the proportional sharing of the loss 80/20%. 
Another example is the CGCs’ right to refuse the payment on 
a guarantee.  The effectiveness of the “exemption clause” that allows 
the CGC to reject a claim for the payment of a guarantee was 
addressed by the Supreme Court of Japan in its (Ju) 1351 of 2014 
decision.219  In that case, the lender failed to conduct proper due 
diligence on the personal guarantor of the loan who served as the 
director of the company borrower.  The Supreme Court held that a 
lender that failed to investigate whether the undertaking of the 
director will be valid and enforceable amounts to a breach of the 
guarantee agreement that exempts the CGC from paying the 
guaranteed amount.  In another case, the Supreme Court held that 
CGC guarantees may not be used to satisfy the borrower’s other 
indebtedness to the lender.220  The lender applied the sum paid by the 
CGC first to an unsecured overdraft and then the remainder on the 
actual loan that was guaranteed.  The Supreme Court held that such 
use of the guarantee is contrary to its purpose, and breach of a clause 
in a contract between the CGC and the lender that precludes 
 
219 Minshu Vol. 70, No. 1. 
220 The Agreement on the Credit Guarantee Corporation Transaction, art. 3.  
See JAPAN FED’N CREDIT GUAR. CORPS., supra note 103, at 278–79. 
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“replacement of old loans with new guaranteed loans.”221  Such a 
breach would partially extinguish the liability of the CGC to pay the 
guaranteed sum corresponding to the breach.  Thus, the lender may 
still claim a payment from the CGC for the amount that corresponds 
to the outstanding obligation of the borrower on the guaranteed loan 
that is less of an incentive to exercise due diligence.   
Notably, CGC rejections of claims on the guarantees by 
lenders are extremely rare.  The Supreme Court decisions protect the 
CGC against lapses of lenders that ordinarily should not occur.  The 
narrow grounds that would entitle the CGC to refuse a claim reinforce 
the lax attitude of financial institutions towards doing due diligence 
on prospective borrowers.  
The lender may expect to be paid if it merely acts in good faith, 
and what elsewhere may fall short of commercially reasonable 
conduct. 222   The conditions and minimal grounds for refusing to 
honor a guarantee set out in agreements with the CGC inevitably 
impact lending practices.  As a condition of participation in the Credit 
Supplementation System, lenders should be required to issue, 
administer, and liquidate guaranteed loans consistent with prudent 
lending standards.  The Agreement on the Credit Guarantee 
Corporation Transaction between the CGC and the financial 
institution, specifically articles 9–11, detail the protection and 
collection of guaranteed obligations including provision of collateral 
and exemption from responsibility.223  However, the guideline is not 
as detailed as the guidelines issued in the United States by the SBA 
with respect to servicing loans and liquidating collateral supporting 
loans guaranteed by the SBA.224  
CGCs may consider issuing more detailed guidelines 
identifying certain actions that should be taken by lenders.  These 
 
221 Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] OCT. 31, 1997, Hei 19 no. 9.  SAIKO 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 4004.  
222 Cf. U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (Am. Law. Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977) 
(requiring all aspects of disposition of the collateral to be in a “commercially 
reasonable” manner).  See also Comm’n Int’l Trade Res. 61/33, at art. 4 (Dec. 4, 
2006) (discussing the relationship between knowledge and compliance when 
waiving one’s right to object in international arbitration). 
223 Credit Guarantee Corporation, Yakujoushorei no Kaisetsu to 
Kaishakushishin (art. 9–11) (interpreting guidelines of the agreement on the credit 
guarantee corporation transactions).  
224 For a sample applicable to U.S. lenders, see OFFICE OF CAPITAL ACCESS, 
SBA 50–57-2, 7(A) LOAN SERVICING AND LIQUIDATION (2015),  
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guidelines would be particularly desirable for loans secured with 
personal property.225  They may relate to administering loans, such as 
to require lenders to collect from the borrower information affecting 
the business, including any changes in the name and location, whether 
of the borrower itself or any personal guarantor, as well as any 
financial information material to the operation of the business.  But, 
also, they may prescribe certain actions to be taken to facilitate 
orderly liquidation of the collateral.  The CGC may prepare 
liquidation plans outlining the steps necessary for lenders to enforce 
their rights in the collateral.226  These plans should be incorporated in 
the contract between the CGC and financial institutions, which 
should also provide for the priority of the CGCs’ deficiency claims.  
Upon default, the collateral should be inspected, inventoried and 
valued. Lenders should be required to take any necessary actions to 
preserve the collateral value, whether prior to or during insolvency.  
A liquidation plan for different types of collateral may give lenders 
the necessary comfort as well as nudge them toward timely 
liquidation of zombie companies rather than preserving their 
existence.  The CGC should be released from liability on a guarantee 
if the lender has failed to make, close, service, or liquidate a loan in 
a prudent manner or if the lender’s improper action or inaction has 
exposed the CGC to risk.227  
Changes should be considered not only at the contractual but 
also at the functional level.  The Credit Supplementation System 
should consider becoming more of a facilitator of private transactions.  
For example, one reason lenders shy away from secured lending is 
the challenge of asset valuation.  To incentivize lenders to engage in 
secured transactions, the CGCs should explore the use of modern 
technology to design secondary markets for collateral that would 
increase the re-sale value of assets.  The CGCs could establish a 
digital platform where receivables of large companies may be posted 
to enable their financing by interested parties.  This mechanism of 
 
225 See Credit Guarantee Corporation, Yakujoushorei no Kaisetsu to 
Kaishakushishin (art. 9–11) (interpreting guidelines of the agreement on the credit 
guarantee corporation transactions). 
226 Office of Capital Access., supra note 224. 
227 Cf. 13 C.F.R. § 120.524 (2019) (deatiling the grounds that entitle the 
United States Small Business Administration to deny paying on the guarantee it 
has issued). 
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reverse factoring has been deployed elsewhere by agencies similar to 
Japanese CGCs.228 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
State interventions are deployed to address market failures 
impacting access to credit.  They should not be designed simply for 
the purpose of increasing the use of financial services per se.  
Furthermore, they should correct the underlying problems in a cost-
effective and complementary manner to market-based financing.229  
Several interventions have had negligible economic impact in Japan’s 
history and were discontinued.  In contrast, credit guarantees support 
about one third of SME credit in Japan.  They fulfill various policy 
goals, including stability of the labor market.  Any reconfiguration of 
the Japanese credit market toward market-based financing must take 
into account the enormous economic significance of the guarantee 
scheme, its role during crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, 
and its foothold in various facets of the economy.  
The policy underpinning a guarantee scheme should not be to 
increase the amount of finance but to facilitate the use of finance in a 
more productive manner.  This effect has been lacking in Japan.  The 
OECD recommended shifting the focus from providing a safety net 
for borrowers, particularly those negatively affected by a (financial) 
crisis, including COVID-19 pandemic, to efficient market-based 
financing that, among others, facilitates restructuring of struggling 
businesses.230  This shift should be accompanied by increasing the 
availability of financing instruments to SMEs.  Transition to market-
based financing is expected to increase the productivity and growth 
of SMEs, and facilitate the exit of economically unviable companies.  
Various Japanese agencies highlighted that borrowers should 
“graduate” from credit guarantees, recommending prioritization of 
support for conventional bank loans.  
The guarantee scheme in Japan should consider some 
modifications to assist the development of market-based secured 
financing.  First, some evidence of inability to obtain an unguaranteed 
 
228 See eg., DE LA TORRE ET AL., supra note 16, at 147–65 (describing the 
impact of such practices in Mexico). 
229 Id. at 164. 
230 See COVID-19 GOVERNMENT FINANCING SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR 
BUSINESSES, OCED 15 (2020). 
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loan may be required.  If the prospective borrower already meets the 
lender’s standard criteria for a market-based loan, a guarantee is 
unjustified.  JFC and CGCs may consider requiring some evidence of 
the prospective borrower not being able to satisfy those criteria as a 
condition of issuing the guarantee.  This would enable the 
policymakers to also assess the financial additionality effect of the 
scheme.231  Second, a business may be entitled to access a guaranteed 
loan only one time, unless it has demonstrated growth in productivity 
while it remains unable to obtain a loan not supported through the 
Credit Supplementation System.  Third, access to guarantees may be 
limited primarily to those borrowers who have not established a 
relationship with a financial institution, such as start-ups.232  Fourth, 
guarantees may be used side-by-side with security interests in 
movable assets, but designed to gradually facilitate the transition to 
secured loans for which a guarantee is unnecessary.  Such collateral 
should not be limited to inventory and receivables, which are the only 
types that currently qualify as liquid assets in Japan, but also include 
equipment and intellectual property rights.  Fifth, in exchange for 
restructuring the guaranteed loan, the borrower should provide 
additional collateral.  An extension of a credit guarantee sustains the 
existence of unproductive zombie companies.  Sixth, the value of 
collateral securing the loan may translate into a reduction in the fee 
for the issuance of a guarantee.  Finally, a higher fee may be imposed 
on the lender that has a track record of extending loans with a high 
default rate. 
The Credit Supplementation System should promote a credit 
culture in which lenders develop prudent lending practices and 
maintain relationships with borrowers.  This would directly address 
the inadequate risk assessment capacity of Japanese lenders.   Without 
such capacity being sufficiently developed, an increase in asset-based 
lending should not be expected.  However, all of these changes will 
have the desired economic effect only if the secured transactions 
framework is aligned with the international principles.  An effort to 
reform that framework is ongoing, and the recovery from the 
COVID-19 pandemic presents an opportunity to redefine the role of 
 
231 See Abraham & Schmukler, supra note 31 (noting that the financial 
additionality measures increase in access to credit and improved lending 
conditions). 
232 Ono et al., supra note 49, at 166. 
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the Credit Supplementation System in enabling market-based 
financing.  
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